{"title":"《核风险与地区竞争:印巴竞争中的危机与稳定》","authors":"Toru Ito","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.2003933","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"India and Pakistan have been at odds with each other since their founding in 1947. The two countries have fought three all-out wars and now face in a nuclear confrontation. Has the advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of the India-Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Indo-Pak) conflict? Will the Indo-Pak conflict develop into nuclear war? This book boldly challenges the conventional wisdom of these questions and argues that both the significance and danger of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context should not be overestimated The author starts with his concern over the tendency to believe that regional conflicts between emerging nuclear powers are more unstable and dangerous than they really are, especially in contrast to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons brought about a “long peace.” The author points out that the Indo-Pak conflict is becoming a symbolic case that has formed this type of negative image, which is ultimately projected onto other cases, such as that of North Korea. Previous studies on the Indo-Pak conflict after the possession of nuclear weapons have generally pointed out two phenomena. The first is the “stability-instability paradox” in which the suppression of large-scale wars by mutual nuclear deterrence promotes low-intensity conflicts. The second is the “competition for escalation dominance,” in which both sides in a nuclear deterrence regime compete for the possibility of initiating a limited war in terms of nuclear and conventional forces in order to improve deterrence and coerce the other side. In many cases in the Indo-Pak relations, the race takes place as a continuous phenomenon. At first, Pakistan, a revisionist state that no longer fears nuclear retaliation from India, intensified insurgency and terrorism, i.e., proxy wars, in the Indian side of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir – J&K) When India began to pursue the option of starting limited conventional war as to not induce nuclear retaliation from Pakistan, Islamabad then sought an option of limited nuclear war through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Delhi. Accordingly, this sequence would lead to an exchange of nuclear attacks and increase the risk of all-out nuclear war. However, the author questions whether the conventional wisdom accurately captures the reality of Indo-Pak relations. In order to examine the validity of the “stability-instability paradox,” the author investigates whether Pakistan has aimed at changing the status quo due to its acquisition of nuclear weapons based on two case studies – insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir on the Indian side, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. The number of incidents and casualties of violence in the J&K region, which has been described as Pakistan’s “proxy war,” has increased sharply since 1989–90, which coincides with the time when Pakistan effectively became a nuclear power. However, there is no evidence to prove causality between the","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"296 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Kaku no Risuku to Chiiki Hunso: Indo Pakisutan Hunso no Kiki to Antei [Nuclear Risk and Regional Rivalry: Crises and Stability in the India–Pakistan Rivalry]\",\"authors\":\"Toru Ito\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/24761028.2021.2003933\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"India and Pakistan have been at odds with each other since their founding in 1947. The two countries have fought three all-out wars and now face in a nuclear confrontation. Has the advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of the India-Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Indo-Pak) conflict? Will the Indo-Pak conflict develop into nuclear war? This book boldly challenges the conventional wisdom of these questions and argues that both the significance and danger of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context should not be overestimated The author starts with his concern over the tendency to believe that regional conflicts between emerging nuclear powers are more unstable and dangerous than they really are, especially in contrast to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons brought about a “long peace.” The author points out that the Indo-Pak conflict is becoming a symbolic case that has formed this type of negative image, which is ultimately projected onto other cases, such as that of North Korea. Previous studies on the Indo-Pak conflict after the possession of nuclear weapons have generally pointed out two phenomena. The first is the “stability-instability paradox” in which the suppression of large-scale wars by mutual nuclear deterrence promotes low-intensity conflicts. The second is the “competition for escalation dominance,” in which both sides in a nuclear deterrence regime compete for the possibility of initiating a limited war in terms of nuclear and conventional forces in order to improve deterrence and coerce the other side. In many cases in the Indo-Pak relations, the race takes place as a continuous phenomenon. At first, Pakistan, a revisionist state that no longer fears nuclear retaliation from India, intensified insurgency and terrorism, i.e., proxy wars, in the Indian side of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir – J&K) When India began to pursue the option of starting limited conventional war as to not induce nuclear retaliation from Pakistan, Islamabad then sought an option of limited nuclear war through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Delhi. Accordingly, this sequence would lead to an exchange of nuclear attacks and increase the risk of all-out nuclear war. However, the author questions whether the conventional wisdom accurately captures the reality of Indo-Pak relations. In order to examine the validity of the “stability-instability paradox,” the author investigates whether Pakistan has aimed at changing the status quo due to its acquisition of nuclear weapons based on two case studies – insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir on the Indian side, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. The number of incidents and casualties of violence in the J&K region, which has been described as Pakistan’s “proxy war,” has increased sharply since 1989–90, which coincides with the time when Pakistan effectively became a nuclear power. 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Kaku no Risuku to Chiiki Hunso: Indo Pakisutan Hunso no Kiki to Antei [Nuclear Risk and Regional Rivalry: Crises and Stability in the India–Pakistan Rivalry]
India and Pakistan have been at odds with each other since their founding in 1947. The two countries have fought three all-out wars and now face in a nuclear confrontation. Has the advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of the India-Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Indo-Pak) conflict? Will the Indo-Pak conflict develop into nuclear war? This book boldly challenges the conventional wisdom of these questions and argues that both the significance and danger of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context should not be overestimated The author starts with his concern over the tendency to believe that regional conflicts between emerging nuclear powers are more unstable and dangerous than they really are, especially in contrast to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons brought about a “long peace.” The author points out that the Indo-Pak conflict is becoming a symbolic case that has formed this type of negative image, which is ultimately projected onto other cases, such as that of North Korea. Previous studies on the Indo-Pak conflict after the possession of nuclear weapons have generally pointed out two phenomena. The first is the “stability-instability paradox” in which the suppression of large-scale wars by mutual nuclear deterrence promotes low-intensity conflicts. The second is the “competition for escalation dominance,” in which both sides in a nuclear deterrence regime compete for the possibility of initiating a limited war in terms of nuclear and conventional forces in order to improve deterrence and coerce the other side. In many cases in the Indo-Pak relations, the race takes place as a continuous phenomenon. At first, Pakistan, a revisionist state that no longer fears nuclear retaliation from India, intensified insurgency and terrorism, i.e., proxy wars, in the Indian side of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir – J&K) When India began to pursue the option of starting limited conventional war as to not induce nuclear retaliation from Pakistan, Islamabad then sought an option of limited nuclear war through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Delhi. Accordingly, this sequence would lead to an exchange of nuclear attacks and increase the risk of all-out nuclear war. However, the author questions whether the conventional wisdom accurately captures the reality of Indo-Pak relations. In order to examine the validity of the “stability-instability paradox,” the author investigates whether Pakistan has aimed at changing the status quo due to its acquisition of nuclear weapons based on two case studies – insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir on the Indian side, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. The number of incidents and casualties of violence in the J&K region, which has been described as Pakistan’s “proxy war,” has increased sharply since 1989–90, which coincides with the time when Pakistan effectively became a nuclear power. However, there is no evidence to prove causality between the