《核风险与地区竞争:印巴竞争中的危机与稳定》

Toru Ito
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引用次数: 0

摘要

印度和巴基斯坦自1947年建国以来一直不和。这两个国家打了三次全面战争,现在面临核对抗。核武器的出现是否改变了印巴(以下简称印巴)冲突的性质?印巴冲突会发展成核战争吗?这本书大胆地挑战了这些问题的传统智慧,并认为核武器在印巴背景下的重要性和危险性不应被高估。作者首先关注的是,人们倾向于认为,新兴核大国之间的地区冲突比实际情况更不稳定、更危险,尤其是与美苏之间的冲突相比。在那里,核武器带来了“长期和平”。作者指出,印巴冲突正在成为形成这种负面形象的象征性案例,这种负面形象最终会被投射到北韩等其他案例上。以往对拥有核武器后印巴冲突的研究,一般指出了两种现象。第一个是“稳定-不稳定悖论”,即通过相互核威慑抑制大规模战争促进了低强度冲突。二是“升级主导权竞争”,即在核威慑体制下,双方为了提高威慑力和胁迫对方,争夺在核力量和常规力量方面发动有限战争的可能性。在印巴关系的许多情况下,这种竞争是一种持续的现象。起初,巴基斯坦是一个修正主义国家,不再害怕印度的核报复,在克什米尔的印度一侧(查谟和克什米尔- J&K)加剧了叛乱和恐怖主义,即代理战争。当印度开始寻求启动有限常规战争的选择,以避免招致巴基斯坦的核报复时,伊斯兰堡随后寻求通过使用战术核武器来威慑德里的有限核战争的选择。因此,这一顺序将导致相互的核攻击,并增加全面核战争的风险。然而,作者质疑传统智慧是否准确地抓住了印巴关系的现实。为了检验“稳定-不稳定悖论”的有效性,作者基于两个案例研究——印度方面克什米尔的叛乱和恐怖主义,以及1999年的卡吉尔冲突——调查了巴基斯坦是否试图改变现状,因为它获得了核武器。查谟克什米尔地区的暴力事件和伤亡人数自1989-90年以来急剧增加,这一地区被称为巴基斯坦的“代理战争”,与巴基斯坦实际上成为核大国的时间相一致。然而,没有证据证明两者之间的因果关系
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Kaku no Risuku to Chiiki Hunso: Indo Pakisutan Hunso no Kiki to Antei [Nuclear Risk and Regional Rivalry: Crises and Stability in the India–Pakistan Rivalry]
India and Pakistan have been at odds with each other since their founding in 1947. The two countries have fought three all-out wars and now face in a nuclear confrontation. Has the advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of the India-Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Indo-Pak) conflict? Will the Indo-Pak conflict develop into nuclear war? This book boldly challenges the conventional wisdom of these questions and argues that both the significance and danger of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context should not be overestimated The author starts with his concern over the tendency to believe that regional conflicts between emerging nuclear powers are more unstable and dangerous than they really are, especially in contrast to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons brought about a “long peace.” The author points out that the Indo-Pak conflict is becoming a symbolic case that has formed this type of negative image, which is ultimately projected onto other cases, such as that of North Korea. Previous studies on the Indo-Pak conflict after the possession of nuclear weapons have generally pointed out two phenomena. The first is the “stability-instability paradox” in which the suppression of large-scale wars by mutual nuclear deterrence promotes low-intensity conflicts. The second is the “competition for escalation dominance,” in which both sides in a nuclear deterrence regime compete for the possibility of initiating a limited war in terms of nuclear and conventional forces in order to improve deterrence and coerce the other side. In many cases in the Indo-Pak relations, the race takes place as a continuous phenomenon. At first, Pakistan, a revisionist state that no longer fears nuclear retaliation from India, intensified insurgency and terrorism, i.e., proxy wars, in the Indian side of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir – J&K) When India began to pursue the option of starting limited conventional war as to not induce nuclear retaliation from Pakistan, Islamabad then sought an option of limited nuclear war through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Delhi. Accordingly, this sequence would lead to an exchange of nuclear attacks and increase the risk of all-out nuclear war. However, the author questions whether the conventional wisdom accurately captures the reality of Indo-Pak relations. In order to examine the validity of the “stability-instability paradox,” the author investigates whether Pakistan has aimed at changing the status quo due to its acquisition of nuclear weapons based on two case studies – insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir on the Indian side, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. The number of incidents and casualties of violence in the J&K region, which has been described as Pakistan’s “proxy war,” has increased sharply since 1989–90, which coincides with the time when Pakistan effectively became a nuclear power. However, there is no evidence to prove causality between the
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来源期刊
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies Social Sciences-Cultural Studies
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
6 weeks
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