对橄榄枝的反应:鹰派、鸽派和公众对合作的支持

IF 8.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS International Organization Pub Date : 2022-07-26 DOI:10.1017/S0020818322000170
Michaela Mattes, Jessica L. P. Weeks
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引用次数: 3

摘要

摘要一种流行的观点认为,外交政策鹰派在与国际对手和解方面具有优势。这种想法植根于国内政治:当选民自己的领导人享有鹰派而非鸽派的声誉时,他们对和解努力的反应会更积极。然而,国内反应只是等式的一部分——要想成功,和解还必须引起对手的积极反应。在这份研究报告中,我们认为,做出和解姿态的鹰派可能会面临国际责任,这可能会抵消他们的国内优势。外国观众应该认为示好的鸽派更真诚,因此应该更愿意支持与外国鸽派合作,而不是与外国鹰派合作。我们进行了两项调查实验,以检验当外国鹰派和外国鸽派伸出橄榄枝时,美国人的反应是否不同。我们发现,外国鸽派更善于引发合作,因为他们被认为更真诚,尽管军事脆弱性的前景限制了美国人甚至对做出姿态的鸽派做出积极回应的意愿。因此,尽管过去的研究表明,鹰派在国内更适合发起和解,但我们的研究结果表明,他们更难从对手那里得到有利的回应。
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Reacting to the Olive Branch: Hawks, Doves, and Public Support for Cooperation
Abstract A popular view holds that foreign policy hawks have an advantage at bringing about rapprochement with international adversaries. This idea is rooted in domestic politics: voters respond more favorably to efforts at reconciliation when their own leader has a hawkish rather than a dovish reputation. Yet, domestic reactions are only part of the equation—to succeed, rapprochement must also evoke a favorable response by the adversary. In this research note, we argue that hawks who make conciliatory gestures may face international liabilities that could offset their domestic advantages. Foreign audiences should view doves who make overtures as more sincere and should therefore be more willing to support cooperation with foreign doves than with foreign hawks. We field a pair of survey experiments to examine whether Americans respond differently when foreign hawks versus foreign doves deliver the olive branch. We find that foreign doves fare better at eliciting cooperation because they are deemed more sincere, though the prospect of military vulnerability limits how willing Americans are to respond positively even to a dove who makes a gesture. Thus, while past research has shown that hawks are better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement, our findings suggest that they have a harder time eliciting a favorable response from the adversary.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.50
自引率
1.30%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: International Organization (IO) is a prominent peer-reviewed journal that comprehensively covers the field of international affairs. Its subject areas encompass foreign policies, international relations, political economy, security policies, environmental disputes, regional integration, alliance patterns, conflict resolution, economic development, and international capital movements. Continuously ranked among the top journals in the field, IO does not publish book reviews but instead features high-quality review essays that survey new developments, synthesize important ideas, and address key issues for future scholarship.
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