第二支柱对税收优惠的潜在影响

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW Intertax Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.54648/taxi2023018
Niels Bammens, Dieter Bettens
{"title":"第二支柱对税收优惠的潜在影响","authors":"Niels Bammens, Dieter Bettens","doi":"10.54648/taxi2023018","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"After lengthy negotiations, the OECD proposed its model rules on Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE) on 20 December 2021. They impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on large multinational companies wherever they operate. Consequentially, the GloBE rules are intended to render tax incentives ineffective to the extent that they reduce the effective tax rate (ETR) on in-scope entities below 15%. Moreover, tax competition should also level off at 15% as tax incentives would no longer increase the attractiveness of a jurisdiction to the extent that they reduce the ETR below this amount. Nevertheless, several design aspects of Pillar Two risk obstructing those objectives. Most notably, the substance based carve-out excludes routine profit from substantive activities from the scope of the GloBE rules on a formulaic basis. This means that incentives can theoretically be maintained and tax competition can continue for this income. In practice, however, the design of the carve-out entails that it does not distinguish between incentives for substantive income and those for non-substantive income. Moreover, the combination of the substance based carve-out and the qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT) could result in a new form of tax competition. international effective minimum taxation, GloBE, Pillar Two, tax incentives, substance based carve-out, qualified domestic minimum tax, OECD, tax competition","PeriodicalId":45365,"journal":{"name":"Intertax","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Article: The Potential Impact of Pillar Two on Tax Incentives\",\"authors\":\"Niels Bammens, Dieter Bettens\",\"doi\":\"10.54648/taxi2023018\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"After lengthy negotiations, the OECD proposed its model rules on Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE) on 20 December 2021. They impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on large multinational companies wherever they operate. Consequentially, the GloBE rules are intended to render tax incentives ineffective to the extent that they reduce the effective tax rate (ETR) on in-scope entities below 15%. Moreover, tax competition should also level off at 15% as tax incentives would no longer increase the attractiveness of a jurisdiction to the extent that they reduce the ETR below this amount. Nevertheless, several design aspects of Pillar Two risk obstructing those objectives. Most notably, the substance based carve-out excludes routine profit from substantive activities from the scope of the GloBE rules on a formulaic basis. This means that incentives can theoretically be maintained and tax competition can continue for this income. In practice, however, the design of the carve-out entails that it does not distinguish between incentives for substantive income and those for non-substantive income. Moreover, the combination of the substance based carve-out and the qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT) could result in a new form of tax competition. international effective minimum taxation, GloBE, Pillar Two, tax incentives, substance based carve-out, qualified domestic minimum tax, OECD, tax competition\",\"PeriodicalId\":45365,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Intertax\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Intertax\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2023018\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Intertax","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2023018","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

经过漫长的谈判,经合组织于2021年12月20日提出了《全球反税基侵蚀规则》(GloBE)示范规则。他们对大型跨国公司的最低税率为15%,无论它们在哪里经营。因此,GloBE规则旨在使税收激励措施无效,因为它们将范围内实体的有效税率(ETR)降低到15%以下。此外,税收竞争也应该稳定在15%,因为税收激励将不再增加司法管辖区的吸引力,以至于它们将ETR降低到低于该金额。然而,第二支柱的几个设计方面可能会阻碍这些目标的实现。最值得注意的是,以实质为基础的规定在公式化的基础上将实质性活动的经常性利润排除在全球规则的范围之外。这意味着理论上可以保持激励,税收竞争可以继续。然而,在实践中,分拆的设计要求它不区分实质性收入的奖励和非实质性收入的奖励。此外,基于物质的分拆和合格的国内最低充值税(QDMTT)的结合可能导致一种新的税收竞争形式:国际有效最低税,GloBE,第二支柱,税收激励,基于物质的分拆,合格的国内最低税,经合组织,税收竞争
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Article: The Potential Impact of Pillar Two on Tax Incentives
After lengthy negotiations, the OECD proposed its model rules on Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE) on 20 December 2021. They impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on large multinational companies wherever they operate. Consequentially, the GloBE rules are intended to render tax incentives ineffective to the extent that they reduce the effective tax rate (ETR) on in-scope entities below 15%. Moreover, tax competition should also level off at 15% as tax incentives would no longer increase the attractiveness of a jurisdiction to the extent that they reduce the ETR below this amount. Nevertheless, several design aspects of Pillar Two risk obstructing those objectives. Most notably, the substance based carve-out excludes routine profit from substantive activities from the scope of the GloBE rules on a formulaic basis. This means that incentives can theoretically be maintained and tax competition can continue for this income. In practice, however, the design of the carve-out entails that it does not distinguish between incentives for substantive income and those for non-substantive income. Moreover, the combination of the substance based carve-out and the qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT) could result in a new form of tax competition. international effective minimum taxation, GloBE, Pillar Two, tax incentives, substance based carve-out, qualified domestic minimum tax, OECD, tax competition
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Intertax
Intertax LAW-
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
50.00%
发文量
45
期刊最新文献
(In)congruence Between Taxation, Spending, and Representation: The Ambiguous Character of Tax-based Contributions Taxing Powers of the European Union Judicial Review of the EU Own Resources Decision by the ECJ Protecting EU Financial Interests in the Collection of Tax-Based Own Resources Article: Conflicts between Directives that Require Taxation of Income and Tax Treaties: The Effectiveness of the EU Primacy-based Conflict Rule
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1