休谟论时间与不变的物体

Q3 Arts and Humanities History of Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.5406/21521026.40.1.02
Todd Ryan, Jani Hakkarainen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们考虑了一个关于休谟对时间的描述的谜题,以及他所说的“坚定不变的物体”——即不变的物体与时间序列共存。一方面,休谟坚持不变的事物在时间上是不可分割的。另一方面,他允许这种不变的物体能够在给定的时间长度内经历一定数量的变化,这似乎意味着它们至少在时间上是可分割的。在认为唐纳德·巴克斯特对休谟时间理论的有影响力的解释不能解决这种紧张关系之后,我们提出休谟对这一困难提出了怀疑的解决方案。
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Hume on Time and Steadfast Unchanging Objects
In this paper we consider a puzzle concerning Hume's account of time and what he calls “steadfast unchanging objects”—that is, unchanging objects coexisting with temporal successions. On the one hand, Hume maintains that steadfast unchanging objects are temporally indivisible. On the other, he allows that such unchanging objects are capable of undergoing a determinate number of alterations in a given length of time, which seems to imply that they are at least potentially temporally divisible. After arguing that Donald Baxter's influential interpretation of Hume's theory of time cannot resolve this tension, we propose that Hume offers a skeptical resolution of the difficulty.
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来源期刊
History of Philosophy Quarterly
History of Philosophy Quarterly Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.40
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