根据卢梭的观点,做一个男人和一个哲学家

Q3 Arts and Humanities Reflexe Pub Date : 2021-09-16 DOI:10.14712/25337637.2021.19
Hana Fořtová
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文旨在分析卢梭如何看待哲学家的可能性,以及他如何看待哲学的任务。虽然卢梭对当代哲学家和哲学持批评态度,但他确实将自己的探索描述为一种哲学探索。在他看来,哲学的正确任务是“人的知识”,也可以理解为“自己的知识”。正如卢梭在《第二话语》中所说,这些知识是通过我们的理性来实现的,但他那个时代的哲学却未能完成这项任务,因为哲学家们让自己被自己的观点所支配。这一主张与卢梭对爱自己(爱的本质)和自爱(爱的实质)的区分有关。虽然理性是自然存在于人身上的,但它只是在与社会进步和社会激情相关的必要条件下发展起来的。因此,它不能作为合法行为的标准;这项任务属于良知。正如德拉塞所表明的那样,只有真正倾听自己良心的人才能正确地运用自己的理性。哲学家解决问题的方法似乎是将自爱转化为对自己的爱,以重建他个人最初的统一,而不是将自爱引导到正确的方向。因此,作为一个人和作为一个哲学家是一样的,转向自己可以成为真正的自我理解以及与他人建立真正关系的基础。
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Být člověkem a být filosofem podle J.-J. Rousseaua
The present paper aims to analyse how Rousseau conceives the possibility of being a philosopher and how he views the task of philosophy. While Rousseau is very critical towards contemporary philosophers and philosophy in general, he does describe his own enquiry as a philosophical one. In his view, the proper task of philosophy is ‘the knowledge of man’ that can be also understood as ‘the knowledge of oneself’. As Rousseau states in the Second Discourse, such knowledge is to be accomplished through our reason, yet the philosophy of his time fails in this task because the philosophers let themselves be dominated by their opinions. This claim is related to Rousseau’s distinction between love of oneself (amour de soi) and self-love (amour-propre). While reason is present in men naturally, it develops only under necessity related to the progress of society and social passions. Therefore, it cannot serve as the criterion of rightful conduct; this task belongs to conscience. As has been shown by Derathé, only man truly listening to his conscience can use his reason properly. Rather than to direct one’s self-love in a right direction, it seems that the solution of the problem for a philosopher is to convert self-love back to love of one-self to recreate the original unity of his person. Being human and being a philosopher thus becomes the same thing and the turn towards oneself can become the foundation of true self-understanding as well as true relationship to others.
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来源期刊
Reflexe
Reflexe Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
审稿时长
25 weeks
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