{"title":"忽略相关的说服:一个完全操纵的结果","authors":"Gilat Levy, Inés Moreno de Barreda, R. Razin","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result\",\"authors\":\"Gilat Levy, Inés Moreno de Barreda, R. Razin\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aeri.20210007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83)\",\"PeriodicalId\":29954,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review-Insights\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review-Insights\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210007\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review-Insights","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210007","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result
We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83)
期刊介绍:
The journal American Economic Review: Insights (AER: Insights) is a publication that caters to a wide audience interested in economics. It shares the same standards of quality and significance as the American Economic Review (AER) but focuses specifically on papers that offer important insights communicated concisely. AER: Insights releases four issues annually, covering a diverse range of topics in economics.