{"title":"Port Royal逻辑的笛卡尔语义","authors":"E. Cassan","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2022.2045129","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"types of argumentation. The results are unsatisfactory both because of unclarity in Aristotle’s classification and because of the fact that argumentation, at least as conceived by Walton, is a much broader category of verbal persuasive interaction than dialectic is for Aristotle and other ancient Greek authors. Reading the entire collection has given me the unfortunate impression that I am even more confused about what ‘dialectic’ and ‘argumentation’ are than when I began. This is not the fault of the authors but seems to be a problem with the concepts. For dialectic we are faced with trying to find some connection between the episteme producing dialectic of Republic VII and the competitive training exercises that Aristotle discusses in TopicsVIII. For argumentation we seem to be faced with an open-ended process of evaluation, counterargument, questioning, responding, etc., as indicated by Walton at the beginning of his article. One of the articles refers to a possible 40-year argumentation between a couple on some recurring problem in their relationship. To have a unified theory about this daunting range of material seems problematic. It seems as achievable as a unified theory of the novel or of football. This is not to say there aren’t interesting or even important things to be said about dialectic and argumentation, but certainly a novice should beware of a false impression of unity where there is rather diversity.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Cartesian Semantics of the Port Royal Logic\",\"authors\":\"E. Cassan\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/01445340.2022.2045129\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"types of argumentation. The results are unsatisfactory both because of unclarity in Aristotle’s classification and because of the fact that argumentation, at least as conceived by Walton, is a much broader category of verbal persuasive interaction than dialectic is for Aristotle and other ancient Greek authors. Reading the entire collection has given me the unfortunate impression that I am even more confused about what ‘dialectic’ and ‘argumentation’ are than when I began. This is not the fault of the authors but seems to be a problem with the concepts. For dialectic we are faced with trying to find some connection between the episteme producing dialectic of Republic VII and the competitive training exercises that Aristotle discusses in TopicsVIII. For argumentation we seem to be faced with an open-ended process of evaluation, counterargument, questioning, responding, etc., as indicated by Walton at the beginning of his article. One of the articles refers to a possible 40-year argumentation between a couple on some recurring problem in their relationship. To have a unified theory about this daunting range of material seems problematic. It seems as achievable as a unified theory of the novel or of football. This is not to say there aren’t interesting or even important things to be said about dialectic and argumentation, but certainly a novice should beware of a false impression of unity where there is rather diversity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-04-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2045129\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2022.2045129","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
types of argumentation. The results are unsatisfactory both because of unclarity in Aristotle’s classification and because of the fact that argumentation, at least as conceived by Walton, is a much broader category of verbal persuasive interaction than dialectic is for Aristotle and other ancient Greek authors. Reading the entire collection has given me the unfortunate impression that I am even more confused about what ‘dialectic’ and ‘argumentation’ are than when I began. This is not the fault of the authors but seems to be a problem with the concepts. For dialectic we are faced with trying to find some connection between the episteme producing dialectic of Republic VII and the competitive training exercises that Aristotle discusses in TopicsVIII. For argumentation we seem to be faced with an open-ended process of evaluation, counterargument, questioning, responding, etc., as indicated by Walton at the beginning of his article. One of the articles refers to a possible 40-year argumentation between a couple on some recurring problem in their relationship. To have a unified theory about this daunting range of material seems problematic. It seems as achievable as a unified theory of the novel or of football. This is not to say there aren’t interesting or even important things to be said about dialectic and argumentation, but certainly a novice should beware of a false impression of unity where there is rather diversity.