人气游戏:直播行业的收入制度与用工控制

IF 1.4 4区 社会学 Q2 SOCIOLOGY 社会 Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI:10.1177/2057150X221090328
L. Xu, Hengyu Zhang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文的案例研究涉及武汉的一个街头表演乐队,该乐队的每个成员都是签约直播的。本研究借用Michael Burawoy的“制作游戏”(the game of making out)概念,将直播行业的用工控制机制描述为“人气游戏”。人气是决定签约主播报酬的劳务价格的关键指标。然而,这个看似客观的人气指标实际上是可以被操纵的。直播者和平台提供商都可以从购买“假人气”中获益。在人气操纵的游戏中,劳资双方的利益结合在一起,达成共识。在合作中,直播者成为资本的同谋,从而失去了对自己劳动产出的控制,劳动投入与报酬的关系被扭曲。通过参与这种操纵,直播者帮助确认了平台经济在意识形态上的主导地位。强调个人责任的新自由主义职业伦理,掩盖了直播等不稳定雇佣模式背后的权力关系。尽管受到了可怕的剥削,但直播者仍然认为自己拥有“独立的命运”。网络平台经济改变了劳资关系。收入分配制度与其他社会因素相结合,往往在劳动控制中起着至关重要的作用。因此,了解这一制度及其对劳动过程和意识形态的影响,是探索“产业制度”或“部门制度”等概念的正确起点。
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The game of popularity: The earnings system and labor control in the live streaming industry
The case study in this paper concerns a street performance band in Wuhan, each of whose members is under contract as a live streamer. Borrowing from Michael Burawoy's concept of “the game of making out”, this study describes the labor control mechanism in the live streaming industry as a “game of popularity”. Popularity is a pivotal indicator of labor price, determining the compensation of contracted live streamers. However, this seemingly objective popularity indicator can in fact be manipulated. Both live streamers and platform providers can benefit from purchasing “fake popularity”. In the game of popularity manipulation, the interests of capital and labor are conjoined, and consensus reached. In collaboration, live streamers become co-conspirators of capital and thus lose control over their own labor output, and the relation between labor input and compensation is distorted. By participating in this manipulation, live streamers help affirm the ideological dominance of the platform economy. The neoliberal work ethic that emphasizes individual responsibility conceals the power relationship behind unstable employment modes like live streaming. Despite being horrendously exploited, live streamers still think of themselves as someone with an “independent destiny”. The online platform economy has transformed the labor–capital relationship. The earnings distribution system, in combination with other social factors, often plays a vital role in labor control. Therefore, understanding this system and its influence on labor processes and ideology is the correct way to start for any exploration of concepts such as the “industry regime” or “sector regime”.
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来源期刊
社会
社会 Social Sciences-Social Sciences (all)
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6799
期刊介绍: The Chinese Journal of Sociology is a peer reviewed, international journal with the following standards: 1. The purpose of the Journal is to publish (in the English language) articles, reviews and scholarly comment which have been judged worthy of publication by appropriate specialists and accepted by the University on studies relating to sociology. 2. The Journal will be international in the sense that it will seek, wherever possible, to publish material from authors with an international reputation and articles that are of interest to an international audience. 3. In pursuit of the above the journal shall: (i) draw on and include high quality work from the international community . The Journal shall include work representing the major areas of interest in sociology. (ii) avoid bias in favour of the interests of particular schools or directions of research or particular political or narrow disciplinary objectives to the exclusion of others; (iii) ensure that articles are written in a terminology and style which makes them intelligible, not merely within the context of a particular discipline or abstract mode, but across the domain of relevant disciplines.
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