任期、专业化、稳健性和收费对持续经营意见与客户破产关系的影响

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting Accounting and the Public Interest Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI:10.2308/api-2022-005
K. Lai
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用持续经营修改审计意见与客户破产之间的关系作为审计质量指标,考察了影响审计质量的因素。这种设置很重要,因为尽管利益相关者经常将之前没有持续经营意见的破产视为审计师独立性受损的证据,但背后可能有各种原因。使用破产和非破产客户的匹配样本,本文发现,当审计师是非专业人士、允许更多增加收入的可自由支配应计项目或收取更高的审计费用时,这种关系不那么积极。这些结果表明,当审计师缺乏足够的行业知识、不那么保守或更依赖审计费用时,他们的审计质量较低。数据可用性:数据可从论文中确定的来源公开获取。
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The Effect of Tenure, Specialization, Conservatism, and Fees on the Relationship between Going-Concern Opinions and Client Bankruptcy
This paper uses the relationship between a going-concern modified audit opinion and client bankruptcy as an audit quality indicator to investigate factors that could affect audit quality. The setting is important because, although stakeholders often view bankruptcies without a preceding going-concern opinion as evidence of impaired auditor independence, there could be various reasons behind them. Using a matched sample of bankrupt and nonbankrupt clients, this paper finds that the relationship is less positive when auditors are nonspecialists, allow more income-increasing discretionary accruals, or receive higher audit fees. These results suggest that auditors provide lower audit quality when they lack sufficient industry knowledge, are less conservative, or are more reliant on audit fees. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.
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来源期刊
Accounting and the Public Interest
Accounting and the Public Interest Business, Management and Accounting-Accounting
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
1
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