The Social Bases of Populist Domination: Market Reforms and Popular Reactions in Latin America and Post-Communist Europe

This article explains why only some post-neoliberal populists successfully keep themselves in power, thereby dominating political systems over the long term. Based on cross-regional dual paired comparisons of ‘crucial’ cases in the Andes and Central Europe, it advances a theory emphasizing societal reactions rooted in prior neoliberal critical junctures. I argue that where well-established and programmatic social democratic parties engaged in bait-and-switch reforms, subsequent populists mobilized extensive electoral coalitions with core support from former leftist constituents, based on which they built organizational capacities for the provision of national public goods that reinforced their popularity over the long term. By contrast, where personalistic leaders politicized regionally based divides through identity-priming appeals and then disproportionately hurt core supporters through bait-and-switch reforms, subsequent populists mobilized more segmented electoral coalitions, built less cohesive parties and provided limited public goods, which undermined their popularity as incumbents. By underscoring parallels in two different world regions, the article challenges institutionalist accounts of populist domination and offers a novel societally focused perspective.