The Natural and the Publick Good: Two Puzzles in Hutcheson's Axiology

Whatever the finer details, Francis Hutcheson is clearly some form of proto-, quasi-, pseudo-utilitarian. But for any utilitarian, the full picture of their moral theory will only emerge once we understand their theory of the good. What, according to said utilitarian, is the nature of happiness? How do we aggregate happiness across persons? In this paper, I discuss two important aspects of Hutcheson's utilitarian axiology each with their own puzzles of interpretation. The first involves Hutcheson's theory of happiness or the ‘natural good’. Hutcheson appears to vacillate between a quantitative hedonism (according to which the value of a pleasure just concerns its intrinsic pleasurableness; its intensity and duration) and a qualitative hedonism (according to which pleasures are not simply judged given their intensity and duration, but also a further qualitative operator). The second concerns Hutcheson's aggregative axiology. Hutcheson appears to offer three inconsistent approaches to understanding the overall good. Bringing these puzzles to light, I think, brings forward a number of challenges in understanding the normative ethics of a key figure in the development of utilitarian moral thought.