Agents of influence: Britain’s secret intelligence war against the IRA

Following revelations in the early 2000’s that agents Denis Donaldson and Stakeknife had been active in the Irish Republican movement, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of the UK’s intelligence war in Northern Ireland. Aaron Edwards’ latest book Agents of Influence provides a new contribution to this key debate. Whilst the broader literature on the IRA and the Peace Process has continued to address the debate surrounding who won the intelligence war, to date it has most notably been advanced by John Bew and Martyn Frampton, and more recently by Thomas Leahy. Agents of Influence contributes some enjoyable key features to the debate. Firstly, it provides a detailed explanation of the UK state’s intelligence mechanics during the Northern Ireland conflict, highlighting the subtle differences between agencies. The indepth understanding demonstrated is a welcome contribution to the field, and complements the work of Christopher Andrew. Edwards, like others before him, shines a light on the difficulties in coordination between different UK intelligence agencies from 1979 onwards. Moreover, he indicates that these issues were partly due to institutional competitiveness and different outlooks. Secondly, the book successfully showcases the challenges the intelligence agencies faced regarding the running of informers and agents. It highlights the ethical questions and debates surrounding informers and agents, and the challenges of balancing those concerns within the conflict. Indeed, the book implies that further guidance from politicians was needed in this field. Finally, Edwards’ range of new interview material used throughout the book is a standout feature. The author interviewed a large number of individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. A personal favourite of this reader were the extracts of interviews with Willie Carlin, a former agent for UK intelligence. Carlin’s testimony provides the reader with glimpses of the on-the-ground situation in Derry in the early 1980s. Agents of Influence argues that the IRA was defeated by the time they signed up to the Good Friday Agreement. However, contrary to Bew and Frampton, Edwards believes this was a ‘secret defeat’ as political intelligence played a major role. That is, agents of influence pushed UK state ideas of peace within the Republican movement, and within its inner-circle; protected the Republican leadership that was pro-peace; and, ensured that its critics were smeared. He acknowledges Leahy’s argument that intelligence did not influence the Republican movement’s armed or political strategy immensely during the conflict. Nonetheless, Edwards describes this argument as ‘just as one-dimensional as those which argue that agents – as just one intelligence-gathering tool – were chiefly responsible for bringing about the end of the IRA’s campaign’ (p. 226). To support the argument that the IRA was defeated, Edwards highlights the fact that they had to abandon the goal of a united Ireland in the Good Friday negotiations. Central to this argument is his interview with Anthony McIntyre, a former IRA volunteer. McIntyre reiterates that the IRA was defeated because the