新冠肺炎期间惩罚和补贴机制对政府、企业和消费者决策的影响——三方进化博弈论分析

IF 3.7 4区 管理学 Q2 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Operations Research Perspectives Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.orp.2022.100255
Yuxun Zhou, Mohammad Mafizur Rahman, Rasheda Khanam, Brad R. Taylor
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引用次数: 5

摘要

基于惩罚和补贴机制影响社会主要参与者的抗疫激励这一事实,本文的问题是在2019冠状病毒病(COVID-19)期间,惩罚和补贴机制如何影响政府、企业和消费者的决策。设计/方法/途径——本文提出了政府、企业和消费者三方参与的进化博弈理论,分析了新冠肺炎期间企业的进化稳定策略,以及惩罚和补贴机制对其策略选择的影响。然后,我们用数值分析模拟了政府、企业和消费者三方博弈的策略形成过程。研究发现——本文提出了四种与实际抗疫形势相适应的进化稳定策略。研究发现,不同的补贴和惩罚机制导致不同的进化稳定策略。无论补贴机制是什么,对企业和消费者的高额处罚都可以促使他们选择积极的预防策略。对于政府来说,惩罚机制优于补贴机制,因为过度的补贴机制会增加政府支出。在实现新冠肺炎三方联防方面,惩罚机制比补贴机制更有效。因此,实施严格的惩罚机制应成为新冠疫情下政府的一项重大举措。原创性/价值——本文是对已有理论工作的延伸。本文运用政治经济学的方法提出了偏好假设,明确阐述了补贴机制和惩罚机制对参与者决策的影响,并比较了它们的适用性。这是现有文献之前没有完成的工作。研究结果可为新冠肺炎疫情防控提供重要的理论和决策依据。
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The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis

Purpose

Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

Design/Methodology/approach

- This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during COVID-19. We then uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, businesses, and consumers for the results of tripartite evolutionary game theory.

Findings

This paper suggests that there are four evolutionary stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. High penalties for businesses and consumers can prompt them to choose active prevention strategies no matter what the subsidy mechanism is. For the government, the penalty mechanism is better than the subsidy mechanism, because the excessive subsidy mechanism will raise the government expenditure. The punishment mechanism is more effective than the subsidy mechanism in realizing the tripartite joint prevention of the COVID-19. Therefore, the implementation of strict punishment mechanism should be a major government measure under COVID-19.

Originality/value

- Our paper extends the existing theoretical work. We use political economy to make the preference hypothesis, and we explicitly state the effect of subsidy and penalty mechanisms on the decision making of participants and compare their applicability. This is the work that the existing literature did not complete before. Our findings can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for COVID-19 prevention and control.

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来源期刊
Operations Research Perspectives
Operations Research Perspectives Mathematics-Statistics and Probability
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
36
审稿时长
27 days
期刊最新文献
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