Da fundação mítica ao exercício da soberania popular: como unir vontade e entendimento?

Political “founding myths” are a recurring theme in many thinkers, from Plato to Rousseau, including Machiavelli and Hobbes. In The Social Contract , Rousseau handles it in the chapter on the Lawgiver, showing that when Moses or Muhammad have given laws to their peoples, they haven’t called them to deliberate rationally about the adequacy of their proposals to public good, since it was impossible for these incipient nations to do reflections of this kind, because they lacked the understanding and social spirit that would allow them to discern the value of this legislation. Thus, the Lawgiver had to persuade people without convincing them, invoking the one valid argument for their ears: divine authority. These ideas pose a crucial problem concerning to other aspects of Rousseau’s thought. For him, the laws are valid only when approved by sovereign people’s will. However, one can ask, as does Hilail Gildin: “Can a society based on a code which a people has been duped into accepting because they believe it to express the divine will, and which a people would not dare to modify for that very reason, be a society in which the people regards itself as the only legitimate source of law?”