Jiamin Liu , Yalin Jiang , Shengdao Gan , Ran Chen
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The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage
The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.
期刊介绍：
The focus of the China Journal of Accounting Research is to publish theoretical and empirical research papers that use contemporary research methodologies to investigate issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance in the Greater China region, countries related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and other emerging and developed markets. The Journal encourages the applications of economic and sociological theories to analyze and explain accounting issues within the legal and institutional framework, and to explore accounting issues under different capital markets accurately and succinctly. The published research articles of the Journal will enable scholars to extract relevant issues about accounting, corporate finance, auditing and corporate governance related to the capital markets and institutional environment.
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