剂量决定：动态公益游戏中的惩罚与合作

Pub Date : 2019-02-26 DOI:10.1561/105.00000084

B. Rockenbach, I. Wolff

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们通过实验研究了合作惩罚在动态公共产品问题中的作用，在这种问题中，过去的回报决定了现在的贡献能力。惩罚对合作的有益作用是脆弱的：成功的合作取决于对如何使用惩罚的共同理解。如果高贡献者过于轻易地惩罚，那么这个群体很可能会走上惩罚和报复的浪费之路。如果惩罚能更有耐心地执行，即使最初不合作的群体也会茁壮成长。因此，当今天™惩罚也决定了明天™在合作能力方面，小组就正确的“剂量”达成一致似乎至关重要™ 制裁惩罚以支持合作。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Dose Does it: Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games

We experimentally study the role of punishment for cooperation in dynamic public-good problems where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities. The beneficial role of punishment possibilities for cooperation is fragile: successful cooperation hinges on the presence of a common understanding of how punishment should be used. If high-contributors punish too readily, the group likely gets on a wasteful path of punishment and retaliation. If punishment is administered more patiently, even initially uncooperative groups thrive. Hence, when todayâ€™s punishment also determines tomorrowâ€™s cooperation abilities, it seems crucial that groups agree on the right â€˜doseâ€™ of sanctions for punishment to support cooperation.

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