{"title":"高级贷款人控制:监控溢出还是债权人冲突?","authors":"Bo Li, Lynnette D. Purda, Wei Wang","doi":"10.1561/108.00000031","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We find that senior loan lender control is positively associated with the corporate bond yield spread at issuance. A one standard deviation change in covenant intensity on a firm’s strictest loan is associated with a 20 basis points (bps) increase in its bond yield spread. The effect is more pronounced for issuers whose bondholders are dispersed or have weak shareholder presence. Our identification primarily relies on using lender-specific shocks as an instrument. Our results suggest that bondholders negatively price senior loan lender control rights outside of financial distress, despite the monitoring benefits they may provide.","PeriodicalId":51955,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Finance and Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2018-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/108.00000031","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Senior Lender Control: Monitoring\\n Spillover or Creditor Conflict?\",\"authors\":\"Bo Li, Lynnette D. Purda, Wei Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1561/108.00000031\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We find that senior loan lender control is positively associated with the corporate bond yield spread at issuance. A one standard deviation change in covenant intensity on a firm’s strictest loan is associated with a 20 basis points (bps) increase in its bond yield spread. The effect is more pronounced for issuers whose bondholders are dispersed or have weak shareholder presence. Our identification primarily relies on using lender-specific shocks as an instrument. Our results suggest that bondholders negatively price senior loan lender control rights outside of financial distress, despite the monitoring benefits they may provide.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51955,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Law Finance and Accounting\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-01-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/108.00000031\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Law Finance and Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000031\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Law Finance and Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000031","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Senior Lender Control: Monitoring
Spillover or Creditor Conflict?
We find that senior loan lender control is positively associated with the corporate bond yield spread at issuance. A one standard deviation change in covenant intensity on a firm’s strictest loan is associated with a 20 basis points (bps) increase in its bond yield spread. The effect is more pronounced for issuers whose bondholders are dispersed or have weak shareholder presence. Our identification primarily relies on using lender-specific shocks as an instrument. Our results suggest that bondholders negatively price senior loan lender control rights outside of financial distress, despite the monitoring benefits they may provide.