高级贷款人控制:监控溢出还是债权人冲突?

IF 0.1 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2018-01-20 DOI:10.1561/108.00000031
Bo Li, Lynnette D. Purda, Wei Wang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们发现,高级贷款机构的控制与公司债券发行时的收益率差呈正相关。公司最严格贷款契约强度的一个标准差变化与其债券收益率差增加20个基点有关。对于债券持有人分散或股东人数不足的发行人来说,这种影响更为明显。我们的识别主要依赖于使用贷款人特定的冲击作为工具。我们的研究结果表明,债券持有人在财务困境之外对高级贷款贷款人的控制权进行了负面定价,尽管它们可能会提供监控收益。
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Senior Lender Control: Monitoring Spillover or Creditor Conflict?
We find that senior loan lender control is positively associated with the corporate bond yield spread at issuance. A one standard deviation change in covenant intensity on a firm’s strictest loan is associated with a 20 basis points (bps) increase in its bond yield spread. The effect is more pronounced for issuers whose bondholders are dispersed or have weak shareholder presence. Our identification primarily relies on using lender-specific shocks as an instrument. Our results suggest that bondholders negatively price senior loan lender control rights outside of financial distress, despite the monitoring benefits they may provide.
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