Corporate power and the resolution of the Eurozone crisis

The literature on the Eurozone crisis overlooks two defining features of the crisis, namely the initial attempt to rely on Private Sector Involvement and financial repression in order to deal with liquidity crises in member states. This paper argues that these gaps stem from the neglect of the concept of corporate power by the literature and offers an analysis of how the crisis emerged and was ultimately resolved in 2008-12 that instead revolves on an account of how corporate structural power determined the outcome of the crisis. La litterature sur la crise de la zone euro ignore deux dimensions determinantes de cette crise, a savoir la tentative initiale d'avoir recours au Private Sector Involvement (les restructurations des dettes) et a la repression financiere, pour traiter les crises de liquidite dans les Etats-membres. Ce working paper soutient que ces lacunes sont dues au fait que la litterature ignore le concept de corporate power (pouvoir des grandes entreprises). Il propose par consequent une analyse de l'apparition et de la resolution de la crise en 2008-12 qui repose sur un recit de la maniere dont le pouvoir structurel des grandes entreprises a determine le cours des evenements.