地方政府收缩的驱动因素：分析效率、机会主义政治周期、政治腐败和金融因素

IF 3.3 3区经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES Journal of Economic Policy Reform Pub Date : 2020-01-23 DOI:10.1080/17487870.2019.1689359

C. Campos-Alba, Emilio José De La Higuera Molina, G. Pérez-López, J. Zafra-Gómez

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引用次数: 17

摘要

摘要本文的主要目的是考察地方政府将以前外包的公共服务重新市政化的可能性。为此，我们使用随机效应面板logit模型研究了141个西班牙城市的样本，这些城市的居民在20000至50000人之间，特别是2014-2016年期间进行的承包业务。我们发现，外包公共服务的地方当局主要受到希望提高效率、选举前一年的政治行为以及前一年发现的政治腐败的影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Drivers of contracting back in local governments: analysing efficiency, opportunistic political cycles, political corruption and financial factors

ABSTRACT The main aim of this paper is to examine the likelihood of local governments remunicipalising public services that were previously contracted out. To do so, we studied a sample of 141 Spanish municipalities with between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, with particular reference to contracting back operations conducted in the period 2014–2016, using a random-effects panel logit model. We found that local authorities that contracted back public services were mainly influenced by the wish to achieve higher levels of efficiency, by political behaviour in a pre-electoral year, and by political corruption detected in the previous year.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Policy Reform Multiple-

CiteScore

6.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Policy Reform focuses on the analysis of economic policy reform. The journal draws upon what lessons can be learned from the successes and failures of countries undertaking reforms and how existing theories can be developed to shed light on positive as well as normative aspects of the reform process. The Journal of Economic Policy Reform encourages work from economists and political economy analysts on policies to promote growth and reduce poverty, intellectual property rights, aid versus trade, debt and debt relief, taxation and social security systems, surveys of key reform issues, as well as on corruption, democracy, emerging markets and the role of multilateral institutions.