认知心理学哲学预设批判

IF 0.9 Q3 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY 中国社会科学 Pub Date : 2022-10-02 DOI:10.1080/02529203.2022.2166294
Shu Yueyu, Gao Shenchun
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要在科学与哲学的历史互动中,实证科学利用累积研究为哲学科学如何理解基本科学问题提供了新的视角。作为一种自我更新的努力,认知科学诞生的最初动力是学科之间的对话,以期解开认知的奥秘。换句话说,认知科学为从根本上更新心理科学的哲学前提,甚至使新的科学世界观成为可能铺平了道路。心理学作为认知科学的一个分支,通过对人性的独特解读,为认知科学的本体论、方法论和科学世界观的更新做出了贡献。然而,在认知科学和心理学的发展过程中,心理学未能运用其学科努力来更新认知科学哲学基础的本体论、方法论和价值观,也未能为认知科学的发展做出贡献。相反,认知科学的机械世界观和实证主义方法论是塑造心理学发展模式的认知科学背景的唯一决定因素,即认知心理学(如果人们将认知心理学视为认知科学与心理学互动的具体表现)。本研究考察了认知心理学的本体论、方法论和价值预设以及科学世界观,并反思了该学科发展的盲目性和被动性。此外,从科学史的角度,思考了该学科的发展如何通过成熟的自然科学与哲学的互动,促进科学哲学中科学概念的更新,从而为心理学未来发展中处理心理学与哲学的关系提供可能。
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A Critique of the Philosophical Presuppositions of Cognitive Psychology
Abstract In the historical interaction of science and philosophy, empirical science has used cumulative research to shed new light on how the science of philosophy understands fundamental scientific issues. As an effort of self-renewal, the initial impetus for the birth of cognitive science was dialogue among disciplines, with a view to making it possible to unlock the mysteries of cognition. In other words, cognitive science was to pave the way for fundamentally updating the philosophical premises of the science of mind or even making possible a new scientific worldview. As a branch of cognitive science, psychology was to have contributed to the renovation of the ontological, methodological and scientific worldview of cognitive science through its unique interpretation of human nature. However, in the course of the development of cognitive science and psychology, psychology has failed to employ its disciplinary endeavors to renew the ontology, methodology and values of the philosophical foundations of cognitive science, and has also failed to contribute to the promotion of cognitive science. On the contrary, cognitive science’s mechanistic worldview and positivist methodology are the sole determinants of the background of cognitive science that shapes psychology’s model of development—that is, cognitive psychology (if one sees cognitive psychology as a concrete manifestation of the interaction of cognitive science and psychology). This study examines cognitive psychology’s ontological, methodological and value presuppositions and scientific worldview and reflects on the blind and passive nature of the discipline’s development. Moreover, from a history of science perspective, it considers how the development of this discipline can contribute to the renewal of scientific concepts in the philosophy of science through the interaction of the mature natural sciences and philosophy and thence provide possibilities for handling the relationship between psychology and philosophy in psychology’s future development.
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来源期刊
中国社会科学
中国社会科学 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
5101
期刊介绍: Social Sciences in China Press (SSCP) was established in 1979, directly under the administration of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Currently, SSCP publishes seven journals, one academic newspaper and an English epaper .
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