Recognizing One More Wrong

Recognizing Wrongs is the latest instalment from the leading civil recourse theorists John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky. It is a defence of the theory of tort law that they have developed, together and apart, for more than two decades. Unlike their earlier book on tort,1 this instalment does not focus on tort doctrine. Instead, it presents, elucidates, and defends from criticism the position that underlies its authors’ analysis of that doctrine. The book is both welcome and important. It is also very well-written: clear and accessible. Because of this, the book is not only the authors’ latest statement of their theoretical position, it will also serve as a good entry point for those coming to the debate for the first time. If, for instance, you have ever wondered with respect to rights-based approaches to tort law generally, ‘Why do people think like this?’, this book provides a very accessible answer. As usual, when reviewing a book, it is important to interpret the work in the light of its intended audience. Who is this book for? In the case of Recognizing Wrongs, the answer is very clear. It is for American legal scholars. Its arguments are explicitly aimed at US academics. Its authors maintain that US academic thought is unable to understand tort law, because it approaches that law via theoretical frameworks inconsistent with that law’s structure. The two main aims of the book are to demonstrate this and to defend an alternative framework that better fits the law and so renders that law intelligible. Though I am very sympathetic with this project, I should immediately confess that I am not a member of this intended audience. I am a New Zealander whose work on tort has focussed primarily on the laws of what we somewhat erroneously label the Commonwealth.2 I am, then, an outsider looking in. Thankfully, given the geographical location of this journal, that seems fitting. Most of the readers of this review will also be outsiders looking in. Because