哲学直觉在人口群体和情况下都出奇地稳定

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI:10.14394/filnau.2021.0007
J. Knobe
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引用次数: 23

摘要

在实验哲学的早期,许多研究似乎表明,人们的哲学直觉在某种意义上​不稳定的​. 此类研究通常使用两种广泛方法中的一种。首先,一些研究着眼于人口因素的影响。在这些研究中,所有参与者都收到了相同的问题,但不同的参与者属于不同的人口群体。结果似乎表明,来自不同人口群体的人具有截然不同的哲学直觉模式(例如,Machery、Mallon、Nichols&Stich,2004;Weinberg、Nichols和Stich,2001年)。其次,一些研究操纵了这种情况的特点。在这些研究中,所有参与者都收到了相同的问题,但研究人员在回答时操纵了参与者所处的情况。研究结果似乎表明,处于不同情况下的人具有非常不同的哲学直觉模式(例如,Swain、Alexander和Weinberg,2008;惠特利和海特,2005年)。这些早期的研究在哲学界引起了极大的关注,并激发了人们对不稳定的哲学含义的持续探索。指导这项研究的核心问题是:“如果我们了解到人们的直觉是不稳定的,我们应该对直觉在哲学中的使用得出什么结论?”试图回答这个问题已经显示出令人印象深刻的复杂性和独创性。然而,近年来,关于哲学直觉的新实证研究激增。这些最近的研究为人们的哲学直觉提供了一幅截然不同的画面。现在的证据表明​哲学直觉令人惊讶​ ​稳定的​ . 事实上,现有的证据表明,哲学直觉在人口群体和情况下都出奇地稳定。本论文的全部目的是审查这一主张的证据。当然,如果这一说法真的是真的,它会立即给我们留下一些更深层次的理论问题,但我不会在这里为任何关于这些更深层次问题的观点辩护。原因并不是这些问题超出了论文的范围。只是我没能想出任何好的答案。
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Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across both Demographic Groups and Situations
In the early days of experimental philosophy, a number of studies seemed to suggest that people's philosophical intuitions were in a certain sense ​unstable​. Such studies typically used one of two broad approaches. First, some studies looked at the impact of demographic factors. In these studies, all participants received the same question, but different participants belonged to different demographic groups. The results appeared to show that people from different demographic groups had radically different patterns of philosophical intuition (e.g., Machery, Mallon, Nichols & Stich, 2004; Weinberg, Nichols & Stich, 2001). Second, some studies manipulated features of the situation. In these studies, all participants received the same question, but researchers manipulated something about the situation participants were in while answering. The results appeared to show that people in different situations had very different patterns of philosophical intuition (e.g., Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). These early studies attracted an enormous amount of attention in the philosophical community, and they inspired a sustained effort to explore the philosophical implications of instability. The core question guiding this research has been: “If we learn that people's intuitions are unstable, what should we conclude about the use of intuitions in philosophy?” Attempts to answer this question have shown truly impressive levels of sophistication and ingenuity. In more recent years, however, there has been an explosion of new empirical research about philosophical intuitions. These more recent studies offer a very different picture of people's philosophical intuitions. The evidence now suggests that ​philosophical intuitions are surprisingly​ ​stable​ . Indeed, the available evidence suggests that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across both demographic groups and situations. The entire aim of the present paper is to review evidence for this one claim. Of course, if the claim does turn out to be true, it immediately leaves us with some deeper theoretical questions, but I will not be defending any view about those deeper questions here. The reason is not that such questions lie outside the scope of the paper. It is simply that I have not been able to come up with any good answers.
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来源期刊
Filozofia Nauki
Filozofia Nauki PHILOSOPHY-
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期刊介绍: Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science) is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic quarterly published by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It publishes articles, notes, and reviews covering the whole range of analytic philosophy, including among others: epistemology, ontology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy. We invite papers not only from professional philosophers but also from specialists in different areas, interested in generalizing their scientific experiences towards more foundational issues.
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