Thwarting code-reuse and side-channel attacks in embedded systems

Embedded devices are increasingly present in our everyday life. They often process critical information, and hence, rely on cryptographic protocols to achieve security. However, embedded devices remain particularly vulnerable to attackers seeking to hijack their operation and extract sensitive information by exploiting side channels and code reuse. Code-Reuse Attack (CRAs) can steer the execution of a program to malicious outcomes, altering existing on-board code without direct access to the device memory. Moreover, Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) may reveal secret information to the attacker based on mere observation of the device. Thwarting CRAs and SCAs against embedded devices is especially challenging because embedded devices are usually resource constrained. Fine-grained code diversification can hinder CRAs by introducing uncertainty to the binary code; while software mechanisms can thwart timing or power SCAs. The resilience to either attack may come at the price of the overall efficiency. Moreover, a unified approach that preserves these mitigations against both CRAs and SCAs is not available. In this paper, we propose a novel SecDivCon approach that tackles this challenge. SecDivCon is a combinatorial compiler-based approach that combines software diversification against CRAs with software mitigations against SCAs. SecDivCon restricts the performance overhead introduced by the generated code that thwarts the attacks and hence, offers a secure-by-design approach enabling control over the performance-security trade-off. Our experiments, using 16 benchmark programs, show that SCA-aware diversification is effective against CRAs, while preserving SCA mitigation properties at a low, controllable overhead. Given the combinatorial nature of our approach, SecDivCon is suitable for small, performance-critical functions that are sensitive to SCAs. SecDivCon may be used as a building block to whole-program code diversification or in a re-randomization scheme of cryptographic code.