如何消除无覆盖市场:政府干预下的双头垄断模式

IF 2.5 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics Pub Date : 2022-10-11 DOI:10.1111/apce.12395
Dongmin Yao, Pengyuan Zhang, Xiaoyu Meng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了消除贫困,政府干预对于解决未覆盖的市场至关重要。为了评估如何有效地做到这一点,本研究构建了一个有政府干预的两家公司模型。研究的重点是不同政府干预策略的前提条件、方法和效果。主要有三个发现。(1) 当消费者收入水平降至某个阈值以下时,就会形成一个未覆盖的细分市场,政府应该进行干预。(2) 政府干预策略可分为补贴型、生产型和混合型,每种类型都实现了不同水平的消费者剩余。给定一定程度的消费者剩余,最优策略会受到生产成本的影响。(3) 对于生产型和混合型干预策略,当市场被覆盖时,如果政府生产成本较低,较低的干预成本可以实现较高的消费者盈余。此外,如果放宽市场覆盖的前提,最优补贴型干预策略会随着产品质量的变化而变化。
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How to eliminate the uncovered market: A duopoly model with government intervention

To eliminate poverty, government intervention is critical for addressing uncovered markets. To assess how this can be done effectively, this study constructs a two-firm model with government intervention. The study focuses on the preconditions, methods, and effects of different government intervention strategies. There are three main findings. (1) When consumer income levels fall below a certain threshold, an uncovered market segment is created, and government intervention should be introduced. (2) Government intervention strategies can be divided into subsidy-type, production-type and mixed-type, and each type achieves a different level of consumer surplus. Given a level of consumer surplus, the optimal strategy is affected by production costs. (3) For production-type and mixed-type intervention strategies, when the market is covered, lower intervention costs can achieve higher consumer surplus if government production costs are low. Furthermore, the optimal subsidy-type intervention strategy varies with the changes in product quality if relaxing the precondition of market coverage.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
12.50%
发文量
37
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