哪一个对耐用品生产商更好,独家还是开放式供应链?

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI:10.1111/jems.12497
Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们探讨了下游耐用品垄断者的供应链问题,他选择以下交易模式之一:与现有供应商的独家供应链或开放供应链,允许垄断者在未来与新的高效进入者进行交易。预计未来零售价格的下降会抑制原有公司的盈利能力。一个有效的进入者的进入放大了这种降价,导致原始公司的共同利润进一步减少。在均衡状态下,下游垄断者选择排他性供应链来逃避进一步的降价,尽管它期望有效进入。
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Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?

We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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