具有组织层级的摩擦劳动力市场中竞争企业的最优晋升

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-10-07 DOI:10.1111/jems.12502
Herbert Dawid, Mariya Mitkova, Anna Zaharieva
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了具有一个初级和一个高级管理职位的层级企业的最优晋升决策,它们在搜索和匹配的劳动力市场中相互作用。员工在受雇于初级职位时会随着时间的推移获得经验,公司必须确定员工获得晋升的经验水平,从而使她能够胜任高级职位。晋升后的员工会在当前公司空缺的情况下转到高级职位,否则他们会在市场上寻找高级职位。竞争企业的晋升截止表现出战略互补性,但我们证明了一般存在一个独特的稳定对称一般均衡。我们发现,如果最初的企业数量较小(较大),从而产生倒U型关系,那么企业之间更强的竞争会导致更晚(更早)的晋升。在存在两个技能群体的情况下,企业之间更强的竞争降低了技能差异的重要性,因此工资和晋升时间的差距随着企业数量的增加而减小。该模型与经验证据相一致,即高技能工人的晋升速度比低技能工人快,内部晋升比跨公司晋升更频繁。
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Optimal promotions of competing firms in a frictional labour market with organizational hierarchies

We study optimal promotion decisions of hierarchical firms, with one junior and one senior managerial position, which interact in a search and matching labour market. Workers acquire experience over time while being employed in a junior position and the firm has to determine the experience level at which the worker receives a promotion which allows her to fill a senior position. Promoted workers move to the senior position in their current firm, if it is vacant, otherwise they search for senior positions on the market. The promotion cut-offs of the competing firms exhibit strategic complementarity, but we show that generically a unique stable symmetric general equilibrium exists. We find that stronger competition among firms leads to later (earlier) promotions if the initial number of firms is small (large) giving rise to an inverse U-shape relationship. In the presence of two skill groups, stronger competition among firms reduces the importance of skill differences, so the gap in wages and promotion times decreases with the number of firms. The model is compatible with empirical evidence that high-skill workers are promoted faster than the low-skilled and that internal promotions are more frequent than cross-firm moves to a higher hierarchical position.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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