夫妻匹配中的有限互补性和稳定路径

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-29 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.005

Benjamín Tello

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了医院只有一个空缺职位的夫妇匹配问题。我们引入了一种限制夫妻对医院配对偏好的约束，称为限制互补性，这是双边可替代性与合同匹配的“翻译”。接下来，我们将Klaus和Klijn（2007）的路径扩展到稳定性结果，表明如果情侣的偏好满足有限的互补性，那么从任何任意匹配中，都存在有限的匹配路径，其中路径上的每个匹配都是通过“满足”前一个的阻塞联盟来获得的，并且最终匹配是稳定的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples

We study matching with couples problems where hospitals have one vacant position. We introduce a constraint on couples’ preferences over pairs of hospitals called restricted complementarity, which is a “translation” of bilateral substitutability in matching with contracts. Next, we extend Klaus and Klijn’s (2007) path to stability result by showing that if couples’ preferences satisfy restricted complementarity, then from any arbitrary matching, there exists a finite path of matchings where each matching on the path is obtained by “satisfying” a blocking coalition for the previous one and the final matching is stable.

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来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.

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