1914年的圣诞节和不可能的和平

IF 0.3 3区 社会学 Q2 HISTORY Diplomacy & Statecraft Pub Date : 2023-07-03 DOI:10.1080/09592296.2023.2239637
Daniel Pellerin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第一次世界大战是如何以及为什么爆发的这个问题占据了整个学术图书馆,但它同样重要和重要的另一个问题——当许多促成爆发的幻想在1914年圣诞节之前已经破灭时,它为什么会持续这么长时间——受到的关注要少得多,尽管最近的学术研究已经开始缩小这一差距。当然,双方的目标和焦虑,以及他们对胜利的持续希望和联合战争的复杂性,对双方都起了主要作用。但是,一些更为隐秘的因素也同样重要:即战争开始时的可怕方式——让各方的期望严重失望,在短短几个月内造成了惊人的500万人伤亡——并没有像教科书上的理性标准所暗示的那样,促使人们准备好认识到事态的发展方向,并因此愿意改变方向。战争开始的几个月非但没有促使交战双方遵守沉没成本原则,通过及时的和解来减少损失,反而产生了相反的效果,使本应不可信的立场变得更加强硬,使交战双方更加坚定了坚持战斗到底的决心,不仅要让敌人付出代价,还要让自己付出代价。这是如何可能的,将通过与前景和决策理论的联系来部分解释。
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Christmas 1914 and the Peace that Could Not Be
ABSTRACT The question how and why the First World War broke out has filled entire learned libraries, but its no less salient and consequential counterpart—how it got to be so protracted when so many of the illusions that contributed to the outbreak were already shattered by Christmas 1914—has received much less attention, though recent scholarship has begun to close the gap. The aims and anxieties of the respective parties certainly played a prime part on both sides, as did their continued hopes of winning and the complications of coalition warfare. But something more insidious counted for just as much: namely how the horrendous manner in which the war began—grievously disappointing expectations on all sides and producing a staggering five million casualties within only a few months—did not induce, as the standards of textbook rationality might suggest, a readiness to recognise where things were headed and a consequent willingness to change course. Instead of prompting the belligerents to heed the sunk cost principle and cut losses by a timely settlement, the opening months had just the opposite effect, hardening positions that should have been discredited, and leaving the belligerents all the more determined to keep fighting to the bitter end at practically any cost not only to their enemies but also to themselves. How this was possible will be explained, in part, by making connections with prospect and decision theory.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
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