《鱼会痛吗?》

J. G. Nickum
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The important thing is to recognize the assumptions and to be certain that the conditions required by the assumptions are met. We assume that animals used in our experiments are representative of a larger population and that experimental conditions are “normal.” When assumptions are not recognized, they can have major effects on results and subsequent conclusions. If assumptions are understood to be optional, the effects can completely negate the conclusions of a study. If the assumptions that we accept lead us to exclude alternative conclusions that are consistent with experimental results, but incompatible with our assumptions, the conclusions probably are biased. Victoria Braithwaite has made a valiant attempt to move the arguments about fish pain beyond beliefs and human perceptions about fish. The research described in her book was planned and executed with care. However, in my opinion, she has failed to provide a scientifically valid answer to her question, because she accepted invalid assumptions concerning pain, nociception, and associative/procedural learning (formerly called “conditioning”). I’ll return to these issues and some additional concerns that I have, but a summary of the book’s content is in order to give readers a better frame of reference. In Chapter 1, the author describes the aim of this book as an attempt to bring the science behind the arguments about pain and fish into the open so that informed discussion can take place. The first chapter, “The Problem,” does an acceptable job of establishing a broad foundation for such a discussion. Chapter 2, “What is Pain and Why Does it Hurt?” chapter begins with the statement that “pain is a personal experience. . .” This is absolutely correct, but it would be more accurate to state that it is a “personal, psychological experience”. Even with humans, with whom no one doubts the reality of pain, we only experience it when we are conscious and the appropriate parts of the brain are fully involved. The author goes on to ask the question “Are animals consciously aware of the pain?” Such a statement carries the assumption that there is pain and the pertinent question is only whether or not the animal is aware of it. Is this a legitimate question? Is it a testable question? Dr. Braithwaite carefully builds a framework for answering these questions in the affirmative, a result that appears to be exactly what she wanted. Chapter 3, “Bee Stings and Vinegar: The Evidence that Fish Feel Pain,” is devoted not only to descriptions of the studies that Braithwaite and her colleagues conducted but structural similarities between fish and humans that may be relative to the ability to experience pain are also discussed. Central to this discussion is the presence of nociceptive receptors (sensory structures) and neural pathways that are similar. In fact, these sensory receptors are referred to as “pain receptors,” thus implying that pain is an external force of some type. In Chapter 4, “Suffer the Little Fishes?” Dr. Braithwaite acknowledges the fact that pain is a psychological matter: “Feeling pain is an emotional experience.” She goes on to state that in order “To find out whether animals feel pain, we need to design experiments that let us glimpse inside their minds to test what the animals are mentally experiencing.. Later in this chapter, the work of Dr. James Rose, author of the most definitive review of fish neurobiology, is challenged because he concludes that fish lack the essential neural structures to experience pain as humans experience it. 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Many people assume that animals, especially vertebrate animals have some human characteristics. Assigning human characteristics to other animals in the absence of strong evidence is anthropomorphism. In this book, Victoria Braithwaite attempts to move beyond anthropomorphism on the question of whether or not fish feel pain. Does she succeed, or does her science include unsupported assumptions that influence the conclusions she develops? All science involves assumptions. The important thing is to recognize the assumptions and to be certain that the conditions required by the assumptions are met. We assume that animals used in our experiments are representative of a larger population and that experimental conditions are “normal.” When assumptions are not recognized, they can have major effects on results and subsequent conclusions. If assumptions are understood to be optional, the effects can completely negate the conclusions of a study. If the assumptions that we accept lead us to exclude alternative conclusions that are consistent with experimental results, but incompatible with our assumptions, the conclusions probably are biased. Victoria Braithwaite has made a valiant attempt to move the arguments about fish pain beyond beliefs and human perceptions about fish. The research described in her book was planned and executed with care. However, in my opinion, she has failed to provide a scientifically valid answer to her question, because she accepted invalid assumptions concerning pain, nociception, and associative/procedural learning (formerly called “conditioning”). I’ll return to these issues and some additional concerns that I have, but a summary of the book’s content is in order to give readers a better frame of reference. In Chapter 1, the author describes the aim of this book as an attempt to bring the science behind the arguments about pain and fish into the open so that informed discussion can take place. The first chapter, “The Problem,” does an acceptable job of establishing a broad foundation for such a discussion. Chapter 2, “What is Pain and Why Does it Hurt?” chapter begins with the statement that “pain is a personal experience. . .” This is absolutely correct, but it would be more accurate to state that it is a “personal, psychological experience”. Even with humans, with whom no one doubts the reality of pain, we only experience it when we are conscious and the appropriate parts of the brain are fully involved. The author goes on to ask the question “Are animals consciously aware of the pain?” Such a statement carries the assumption that there is pain and the pertinent question is only whether or not the animal is aware of it. Is this a legitimate question? Is it a testable question? Dr. Braithwaite carefully builds a framework for answering these questions in the affirmative, a result that appears to be exactly what she wanted. Chapter 3, “Bee Stings and Vinegar: The Evidence that Fish Feel Pain,” is devoted not only to descriptions of the studies that Braithwaite and her colleagues conducted but structural similarities between fish and humans that may be relative to the ability to experience pain are also discussed. Central to this discussion is the presence of nociceptive receptors (sensory structures) and neural pathways that are similar. In fact, these sensory receptors are referred to as “pain receptors,” thus implying that pain is an external force of some type. In Chapter 4, “Suffer the Little Fishes?” Dr. Braithwaite acknowledges the fact that pain is a psychological matter: “Feeling pain is an emotional experience.” She goes on to state that in order “To find out whether animals feel pain, we need to design experiments that let us glimpse inside their minds to test what the animals are mentally experiencing.. 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引用次数: 2

摘要

鱼会痛吗?也许真正的问题是:人类认为鱼能感觉到疼痛吗?个体在回答第二个问题时得出的结论似乎取决于他们对鱼的看法,也许还有对动物的看法。信念,反过来,可能包含也可能不包含确凿的证据,但信念总是包含假设。假设是日常生活的一部分,包括科学。许多人认为动物,尤其是脊椎动物有一些人类的特征。在缺乏有力证据的情况下,将人类特征赋予其他动物是拟人论。在这本书中,维多利亚·布雷斯韦特试图超越拟人论,探讨鱼是否会感到疼痛的问题。她成功了吗,还是她的科学中包含了一些不受支持的假设,影响了她得出的结论?所有的科学都涉及假设。重要的是要认识到这些假设,并确定这些假设所要求的条件得到满足。我们假设实验中使用的动物代表了更大的种群,并且实验条件是“正常的”。当假设不被认可时,它们会对结果和随后的结论产生重大影响。如果假设被理解为是可选的,其影响可以完全否定研究的结论。如果我们接受的假设导致我们排除了与实验结果一致,但与我们的假设不相容的其他结论,那么结论可能是有偏见的。维多利亚·布雷斯韦特(Victoria Braithwaite)做出了勇敢的尝试,将关于鱼痛的争论超越了信仰和人类对鱼的看法。她书中描述的研究是精心策划和执行的。然而,在我看来,她没有为她的问题提供一个科学有效的答案,因为她接受了关于疼痛、伤害感觉和联想/程序学习(以前称为“条件反射”)的无效假设。我将回到这些问题和我所关心的一些其他问题上,但是为了给读者提供一个更好的参考框架,我将对本书的内容进行总结。在第一章中,作者将本书的目的描述为试图将关于疼痛和鱼的争论背后的科学带入公开,以便进行知情的讨论。第一章“问题”为这样的讨论建立了一个广泛的基础,这是可以接受的。第二章“什么是疼痛,为什么会痛?”这一章以“疼痛是一种个人体验……”这一陈述开始,这是绝对正确的,但更准确的说法是,它是一种“个人的、心理的体验”。即使是人类,没有人怀疑疼痛的真实性,我们也只有在有意识的时候才会体验到疼痛,并且大脑的适当部分完全参与其中。作者接着提出了一个问题:“动物有意识地意识到疼痛吗?”这种说法带有这样一种假设,即疼痛是存在的,而相关的问题只是动物是否意识到疼痛。这是一个合理的问题吗?这是一个可测试的问题吗?布雷斯韦特博士精心构建了一个框架,以肯定的方式回答这些问题,这个结果似乎正是她想要的。第三章“蜜蜂蜇伤和醋:鱼能感觉到疼痛的证据”不仅描述了Braithwaite和她的同事所做的研究,而且还讨论了鱼和人类在结构上的相似性,这些相似性可能与体验疼痛的能力有关。这个讨论的中心是伤害感受器(感觉结构)和神经通路的存在是相似的。事实上,这些感觉感受器被称为“疼痛感受器”,因此暗示疼痛是某种类型的外力。在第四章“让小鱼们受苦吗?”布雷斯韦特博士承认疼痛是一种心理问题:“感觉疼痛是一种情感体验。”她接着说,为了“弄清楚动物是否会感到疼痛,我们需要设计实验,让我们一瞥它们的内心,来测试动物的心理体验……在本章的后面,詹姆斯·罗斯博士的工作受到了挑战,他是鱼类神经生物学最权威评论的作者,因为他得出结论,鱼类缺乏像人类一样体验疼痛的基本神经结构。不同的定义或假设
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A Review of “Do Fish Feel Pain?”
Do fish feel pain? Perhaps the real question is: Do humans think that fish feel pain? The conclusions that individuals develop in answer to the second question seem to depend on the beliefs they have about fish and, perhaps, animals in general. Beliefs, in turn, may or may not involve solid evidence, but beliefs always involve assumptions. Assumptions are part of everyday life, including science. Many people assume that animals, especially vertebrate animals have some human characteristics. Assigning human characteristics to other animals in the absence of strong evidence is anthropomorphism. In this book, Victoria Braithwaite attempts to move beyond anthropomorphism on the question of whether or not fish feel pain. Does she succeed, or does her science include unsupported assumptions that influence the conclusions she develops? All science involves assumptions. The important thing is to recognize the assumptions and to be certain that the conditions required by the assumptions are met. We assume that animals used in our experiments are representative of a larger population and that experimental conditions are “normal.” When assumptions are not recognized, they can have major effects on results and subsequent conclusions. If assumptions are understood to be optional, the effects can completely negate the conclusions of a study. If the assumptions that we accept lead us to exclude alternative conclusions that are consistent with experimental results, but incompatible with our assumptions, the conclusions probably are biased. Victoria Braithwaite has made a valiant attempt to move the arguments about fish pain beyond beliefs and human perceptions about fish. The research described in her book was planned and executed with care. However, in my opinion, she has failed to provide a scientifically valid answer to her question, because she accepted invalid assumptions concerning pain, nociception, and associative/procedural learning (formerly called “conditioning”). I’ll return to these issues and some additional concerns that I have, but a summary of the book’s content is in order to give readers a better frame of reference. In Chapter 1, the author describes the aim of this book as an attempt to bring the science behind the arguments about pain and fish into the open so that informed discussion can take place. The first chapter, “The Problem,” does an acceptable job of establishing a broad foundation for such a discussion. Chapter 2, “What is Pain and Why Does it Hurt?” chapter begins with the statement that “pain is a personal experience. . .” This is absolutely correct, but it would be more accurate to state that it is a “personal, psychological experience”. Even with humans, with whom no one doubts the reality of pain, we only experience it when we are conscious and the appropriate parts of the brain are fully involved. The author goes on to ask the question “Are animals consciously aware of the pain?” Such a statement carries the assumption that there is pain and the pertinent question is only whether or not the animal is aware of it. Is this a legitimate question? Is it a testable question? Dr. Braithwaite carefully builds a framework for answering these questions in the affirmative, a result that appears to be exactly what she wanted. Chapter 3, “Bee Stings and Vinegar: The Evidence that Fish Feel Pain,” is devoted not only to descriptions of the studies that Braithwaite and her colleagues conducted but structural similarities between fish and humans that may be relative to the ability to experience pain are also discussed. Central to this discussion is the presence of nociceptive receptors (sensory structures) and neural pathways that are similar. In fact, these sensory receptors are referred to as “pain receptors,” thus implying that pain is an external force of some type. In Chapter 4, “Suffer the Little Fishes?” Dr. Braithwaite acknowledges the fact that pain is a psychological matter: “Feeling pain is an emotional experience.” She goes on to state that in order “To find out whether animals feel pain, we need to design experiments that let us glimpse inside their minds to test what the animals are mentally experiencing.. Later in this chapter, the work of Dr. James Rose, author of the most definitive review of fish neurobiology, is challenged because he concludes that fish lack the essential neural structures to experience pain as humans experience it. Differing definitions or assumptions
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Reviews in Fisheries Science
Reviews in Fisheries Science 农林科学-渔业
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