投票中的集体“国会”?国会选举中集体责任的选民与集体层面分析

Carlos Algara
{"title":"投票中的集体“国会”?国会选举中集体责任的选民与集体层面分析","authors":"Carlos Algara","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The traditional view among scholars is that voters do not weigh job performance in their congressional voting decisions. Recent work challenges this notion and provides evidence that congressional job approval matters at the ballot box. However, scholars are divided as to which party benefits from positive job approval ratings. Moreover, the literature is unclear regarding the conditions under which voters hold individual candidates accountable for the collective performance of Congress. Analyzing individual and aggregate-level data, this study produces several key findings: (1) assessments of congressional job performance are directly tied to the electoral standing of the majority party; (2) positive approval ratings raise the level of support for majority party candidates among minority partisans and those closest to the minority in ideological proximity; and (3) majority party incumbents gain more from congressional approval than nonincumbents and suffer less of a loss from congressional disapproval. These findings provide a clearer narrative of how collective accountability works in congressional elections and the incentives for majority and minority party behavior in the contemporary Congress.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Collective “Congress” on the Ballot? A Voter and Aggregate-Level Analysis of Collective Responsibility in Congressional Elections\",\"authors\":\"Carlos Algara\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The traditional view among scholars is that voters do not weigh job performance in their congressional voting decisions. Recent work challenges this notion and provides evidence that congressional job approval matters at the ballot box. However, scholars are divided as to which party benefits from positive job approval ratings. Moreover, the literature is unclear regarding the conditions under which voters hold individual candidates accountable for the collective performance of Congress. Analyzing individual and aggregate-level data, this study produces several key findings: (1) assessments of congressional job performance are directly tied to the electoral standing of the majority party; (2) positive approval ratings raise the level of support for majority party candidates among minority partisans and those closest to the minority in ideological proximity; and (3) majority party incumbents gain more from congressional approval than nonincumbents and suffer less of a loss from congressional disapproval. These findings provide a clearer narrative of how collective accountability works in congressional elections and the incentives for majority and minority party behavior in the contemporary Congress.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-04-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1814903","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

学者们的传统观点是,选民在投票决定国会时并不考虑工作表现。最近的研究挑战了这一观念,并提供证据表明,国会工作批准在投票箱中很重要。但是,学者们对哪一方从积极的工作支持率中获益存在分歧。此外,关于选民要求个别候选人对国会的集体表现负责的条件,文献也不清楚。本研究分析了个人和总体层面的数据,得出了几个关键发现:(1)对国会工作表现的评估与多数党的选举地位直接相关;(2)积极的支持率提高了少数党派和意识形态接近少数党派的人对多数党候选人的支持程度;(3)多数党现任者从国会的批准中获得的收益比非现任者多,而国会的反对给他们带来的损失也更少。这些发现为集体问责制如何在国会选举中发挥作用以及当代国会中多数党和少数党行为的激励机制提供了更清晰的叙述。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The Collective “Congress” on the Ballot? A Voter and Aggregate-Level Analysis of Collective Responsibility in Congressional Elections
Abstract The traditional view among scholars is that voters do not weigh job performance in their congressional voting decisions. Recent work challenges this notion and provides evidence that congressional job approval matters at the ballot box. However, scholars are divided as to which party benefits from positive job approval ratings. Moreover, the literature is unclear regarding the conditions under which voters hold individual candidates accountable for the collective performance of Congress. Analyzing individual and aggregate-level data, this study produces several key findings: (1) assessments of congressional job performance are directly tied to the electoral standing of the majority party; (2) positive approval ratings raise the level of support for majority party candidates among minority partisans and those closest to the minority in ideological proximity; and (3) majority party incumbents gain more from congressional approval than nonincumbents and suffer less of a loss from congressional disapproval. These findings provide a clearer narrative of how collective accountability works in congressional elections and the incentives for majority and minority party behavior in the contemporary Congress.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
期刊最新文献
Wallach, Philip A. Why Congress Wallach, Philip A. Why Congress . New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2023. 336 pages. $29.95 (hardcover). Peake, Jeffrey S. Dysfunctional Diplomacy: The Politics of International Agreements in an Era of Partisan Polarization Bird, R. Kenton, and John C. Pierce. Tom Foley: The Man in the MiddleBird, R. Kenton, and John C. Pierce. Tom Foley: The Man in the Middle . Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2023. 256 pages. $32.95 (hardcover). Kornberg, Maya L. Inside Congressional Committees: Function and Dysfunction in the Legislative Process Herrnson, Paul S., Colton C. Campbell, and David A. Dulio, Eds. Under the Iron Dome: Congress from the Inside
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1