{"title":"同性恋蛋糕案:最高法院在asher案中做了什么,没做什么","authors":"C. McCrudden","doi":"10.1093/ojlr/rwaa011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The Supreme Court got it right in the Ashers (‘Gay cake’) case. It decided correctly the important legal issues central to the case: the scope of indissociability; the scope of ‘associative’ discrimination in sexual orientation goods and services discrimination claims; whose characteristics are relevant for determining whether an action amounts to unlawful discrimination; and the extent of the protection which freedom of expression accords individual service providers and companies from ‘forced’ or ‘compelled’ political and religious expression. Much of the critical commentary that followed the case is overblown. In some respects, the case is somewhat less legally significant, and less legally controversial, than the commentary would suggest. Underlying some of the resistance to the decision is a sense that the Court should have manipulated the legal test of unlawful discrimination to reach a morally satisfying result. This is not how the Court should decide such cases, leading as it does to a severe rupture with the idea of legality and the Rule of Law. In any event, the three (moral) arguments that are drawn on—dignity, equality, and conscience-scepticism—are less helpful that might appear in addressing Ashers-type cases, and do not undermine the normative foundations of the Supreme Court's decision.","PeriodicalId":44058,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Law and Religion","volume":"7 1","pages":"238-270"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ojlr/rwaa011","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Gay Cake Case: What the Supreme Court Did, and Didn’t, Decide in Ashers\",\"authors\":\"C. McCrudden\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ojlr/rwaa011\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The Supreme Court got it right in the Ashers (‘Gay cake’) case. It decided correctly the important legal issues central to the case: the scope of indissociability; the scope of ‘associative’ discrimination in sexual orientation goods and services discrimination claims; whose characteristics are relevant for determining whether an action amounts to unlawful discrimination; and the extent of the protection which freedom of expression accords individual service providers and companies from ‘forced’ or ‘compelled’ political and religious expression. Much of the critical commentary that followed the case is overblown. In some respects, the case is somewhat less legally significant, and less legally controversial, than the commentary would suggest. Underlying some of the resistance to the decision is a sense that the Court should have manipulated the legal test of unlawful discrimination to reach a morally satisfying result. This is not how the Court should decide such cases, leading as it does to a severe rupture with the idea of legality and the Rule of Law. In any event, the three (moral) arguments that are drawn on—dignity, equality, and conscience-scepticism—are less helpful that might appear in addressing Ashers-type cases, and do not undermine the normative foundations of the Supreme Court's decision.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44058,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Journal of Law and Religion\",\"volume\":\"7 1\",\"pages\":\"238-270\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ojlr/rwaa011\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Journal of Law and Religion\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwaa011\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Journal of Law and Religion","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwaa011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Gay Cake Case: What the Supreme Court Did, and Didn’t, Decide in Ashers
The Supreme Court got it right in the Ashers (‘Gay cake’) case. It decided correctly the important legal issues central to the case: the scope of indissociability; the scope of ‘associative’ discrimination in sexual orientation goods and services discrimination claims; whose characteristics are relevant for determining whether an action amounts to unlawful discrimination; and the extent of the protection which freedom of expression accords individual service providers and companies from ‘forced’ or ‘compelled’ political and religious expression. Much of the critical commentary that followed the case is overblown. In some respects, the case is somewhat less legally significant, and less legally controversial, than the commentary would suggest. Underlying some of the resistance to the decision is a sense that the Court should have manipulated the legal test of unlawful discrimination to reach a morally satisfying result. This is not how the Court should decide such cases, leading as it does to a severe rupture with the idea of legality and the Rule of Law. In any event, the three (moral) arguments that are drawn on—dignity, equality, and conscience-scepticism—are less helpful that might appear in addressing Ashers-type cases, and do not undermine the normative foundations of the Supreme Court's decision.
期刊介绍:
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of religion in public life and a concomitant array of legal responses. This has led in turn to the proliferation of research and writing on the interaction of law and religion cutting across many disciplines. The Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (OJLR) will have a range of articles drawn from various sectors of the law and religion field, including: social, legal and political issues involving the relationship between law and religion in society; comparative law perspectives on the relationship between religion and state institutions; developments regarding human and constitutional rights to freedom of religion or belief; considerations of the relationship between religious and secular legal systems; and other salient areas where law and religion interact (e.g., theology, legal and political theory, legal history, philosophy, etc.). The OJLR reflects the widening scope of study concerning law and religion not only by publishing leading pieces of legal scholarship but also by complementing them with the work of historians, theologians and social scientists that is germane to a better understanding of the issues of central concern. We aim to redefine the interdependence of law, humanities, and social sciences within the widening parameters of the study of law and religion, whilst seeking to make the distinctive area of law and religion more comprehensible from both a legal and a religious perspective. We plan to capture systematically and consistently the complex dynamics of law and religion from different legal as well as religious research perspectives worldwide. The OJLR seeks leading contributions from various subdomains in the field and plans to become a world-leading journal that will help shape, build and strengthen the field as a whole.