公立和私立教育体系下的财富分配和技能培养

IF 0.8 Q4 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES Indian Growth and Development Review Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI:10.1108/igdr-02-2020-0025
Sriparna Goswami, Bidisha Chakraborty
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文旨在了解在私立、公立和混合教育三种教育模式下,财富分配对人力资本积累和熟练-非熟练劳动力产生的不同影响。设计/方法论/方法作者使用了重叠代模型。财富动态表明,私立教育系统和公立教育系统都有两种可能的结果——停滞和稳定增长,这取决于教育系统的效率、技能溢价和其他参数。讨论了通过投票选择教育制度的问题。研究发现,在经济公共教育支出较低的情况下,技术工人倾向于私立教育,而非技术工人倾向于私立教育。研究的局限性/意义这项研究受到一些限制。本文认为利率和工资率是外生给定的,因此忽略了一般均衡效应。作者没有考虑劳动-休闲的选择。在模型中引入劳动闲暇选择将改变许多结果。作者没有考虑个体间的异质性能力。不同教育体制的效率差异分析需要进一步严谨的研究。此外,本文没有考虑其他职业,如创业和自雇。本文认为劳动需求函数是完全弹性的,因此不考虑任何需求约束。如果遗赠被征税会发生什么?如果父母不是无私的会发生什么?这些问题可能在未来的研究中得到解决。如果在任何一个国家,纳税的熟练劳动力的比例都很低,那么纯粹的公共教育可能无法产生持续的人力资本增长。对于拥有足够大比例熟练劳动力的国家来说,公共教育体系将是成功的。另一方面,如果技能溢价低或教育系统管理不善,私立教育系统也可能失败。原创性/价值在调查在财富分配不平等的情况下公立和私立教育对增长和发展的影响时,作者试图解决几个问题。首先,为什么公共教育系统在发达国家成功地积累了技能,而在欠发达国家却失败了?第二,为什么一些教育机构主要由私人经营的国家在人力资本生产方面表现得更好,而另一些国家则不然?第三,在一个财富分配不平等的经济体中,什么因素导致公立或私立教育作为投票均衡的结果?
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Wealth distribution and skills generation under public and private education systems
Purpose This paper aims to understand the differing impacts of wealth distribution on human capital accumulation and skilled-unskilled labour generation under three educational paradigms as follows: private, public and a system of mixed education. Design/methodology/approach The authors use an overlapping generations model. Findings The wealth dynamics show that both in the private education system and public education system, there are two possible outcomes- stagnation and steady growth depending on the efficiency of the education system, skill premium and other parameters. The choice of the education system through voting is discussed. It is found that skilled workers would always vote for private education whilst unskilled workers vote for private education if public education expenditure of the economy is low. Research limitations/implications The study is subject to several limitations. This paper considers the rate of interest and wage rate to be exogenously given, and thus ignores the general equilibrium effects. The authors do not consider the labour-leisure choice. The introduction of labour leisure choice in the model would alter many of the results. The authors do not consider heterogeneous ability across individuals. The analysis of the differential efficiency of the different education systems needs further, rigorous research. Also, this paper does not consider other occupations such as entrepreneurship and self-employment. This paper considers the labour demand function to be perfectly elastic, and hence, does not consider any demand constraint. What happens if bequests are taxed? What happens if parents are not altruistic? These questions may be addressed in future research. Social implications If the proportion of tax paying skilled labour is low in any country, pure public education may not be able to generate sustained human capital growth. For countries with a sufficiently large proportion of skilled labour, the public education system would be successful. On the other hand, if skill premium is low or the education system is poorly managed private education system may fail too. Originality/value Whilst investigating the effects of public vs private education on growth and development in the presence of unequal wealth distribution, The authors have tried to address a few questions. First, why the public education system has been successful in skill accumulation in developed countries whilst it has failed to do so in less developed countries? Second, why do some countries with mostly privately run educational institutions perform much better in human capital production whilst others do not? Third, in an economy with unequal wealth distribution, what are the factors that result in public or private education as a voting equilibrium outcome?
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