{"title":"软法在立陶宛宪法解释中的地位","authors":"Donatas Murauskas","doi":"10.15388/teise.2021.121.6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I examine the status of soft law in the official interpretation of the Lithuanian Constitution. The “living constitution” doctrine dominates the Lithuanian constitutional scholarship. I question this dominance by providing insights on the essence and application potential of the alternative methodology – the doctrine of originalism. Based on originalistic approach, I doubt the normative claim made in Lithuanian constitutional scholarship that soft law could be considered as a mandatory source of interpretation of the Lithuanian Constitution.","PeriodicalId":33051,"journal":{"name":"Teise","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Status of Soft Law in Interpreting the Lithuanian Constitution\",\"authors\":\"Donatas Murauskas\",\"doi\":\"10.15388/teise.2021.121.6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, I examine the status of soft law in the official interpretation of the Lithuanian Constitution. The “living constitution” doctrine dominates the Lithuanian constitutional scholarship. I question this dominance by providing insights on the essence and application potential of the alternative methodology – the doctrine of originalism. Based on originalistic approach, I doubt the normative claim made in Lithuanian constitutional scholarship that soft law could be considered as a mandatory source of interpretation of the Lithuanian Constitution.\",\"PeriodicalId\":33051,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Teise\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Teise\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15388/teise.2021.121.6\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Teise","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15388/teise.2021.121.6","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Status of Soft Law in Interpreting the Lithuanian Constitution
In this paper, I examine the status of soft law in the official interpretation of the Lithuanian Constitution. The “living constitution” doctrine dominates the Lithuanian constitutional scholarship. I question this dominance by providing insights on the essence and application potential of the alternative methodology – the doctrine of originalism. Based on originalistic approach, I doubt the normative claim made in Lithuanian constitutional scholarship that soft law could be considered as a mandatory source of interpretation of the Lithuanian Constitution.