意大利养老金制度中的生存不平等和再分配

G. Caselli, R. Lipsi
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The gap between the LCFs and the factors obtained by allowing for differential survival across gender and socio-demographic groups (CFs) gives us a means of making a quantitative assessment of the implicit redistributive impacts of the annuity redistribution from individuals with a lower life expectancy to individuals with a higher life expectancy. 1 Italian pension reform: an introduction Since the mid-1970s, the demographic behaviour of Italians has undergone profound changes that have modified the population dynamics of the country both directly and indirectly, and have thus had significant consequences for various aspects of social and economic life in Italy. The slow but inexorable shift in the demographic profile of Italy has been caused by declining fertility on the one hand, and increasing survival on the other. It is generally understood that when the ∗ Graziella Caselli (corresponding author), Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Statistical Sciences, Viale Regina Elena 295, 00161, Rome, Italy Email: graziella.caselli@uniroma1.it Rosa Maria Lipsi, Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Italy The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbookXXXX 2 Survival inequalities and redistribution in the Italian pension system younger cohorts are constantly shrinking even as the older cohorts are expanding, the population will age. In 2016, Italy and Germany were the European countries with the highest shares of the population aged 65 or older: 21.9 per cent for Italy and 21.2 per cent for Germany. This figure for Italy seems even more significant if we consider that it represents a population of almost 14 million, up from four million in 1951 (eight per cent of the total population). Although demographers had been issuing detailed warnings of this demographic shift since the late 1970s (Vitali 1976; Golini and Pinnelli 1983; Golini 1987), politicians were slow to realise that given the speed at which the ageing process was advancing, this shift would have an unprecedented impact on the country’s public expenditures starting around the turn of the century. It was especially difficult to persuade politicians to pay attention to pension expenditures in the years when the combined effects of the growth of the population of working ages (due to the postwar baby boom that continued into the early 1960s) and high employment levels were pouring an unprecedented surplus into the coffers of the pension system. For many years, the retirement age and the pay-as-you-go system were not a problem – indeed, the revenue generated by this system could easily cover expenditures on welfare as well. When the first worrying signs of a rapid increase in pension expenditures began to appear in the 1990s, there was still no sense of urgency among policy-makers. While some minor adjustments to the retirement system were made, more drastic interventions would be required in the future. At that time, the retirement age was raised, early retirement pensions were scaled back (early retirement was still possible for workers with 35 years of contributions, and as little as 20 in the public sector), and years of contributions were tied more closely to pension size. From 1995 onwards, a new method of calculating pension benefits – a “contribution system” that we describe in detail in this paper – was phased in (with the “1995 Dini reform”: Law of 8 August 1995, No. 335 (Table A.1, Appendix)). This system will go into full effect in 2030-35, when the baby boom generations born in the 1960s will have left the work force and become pensioners themselves. It is becoming increasingly clear that the implementation of this reform has been too gradual. While additional legislative measures aimed at reforming the retirement system were approved in 2011, pension expenditures have continued to grow at an unsustainable rate, triggering the need for a further series of pension reforms (Figure 1). Law Decree No. 201/2011 (known as the 2011 “salva Italia” decree), which included the “2011 Fornero reform” (Table A.1, Appendix), made two important changes to the retirement system. The decree brought the implementation of the “1995 Dini reform” forward many years by introducing a pro-rata contribution system for all workers starting on 1 January 2012. The legislation also raised the minimum retirement age to 66 for men; and from age 60 to age 62 for employed women, followed by a phase-in period to age 66 by 2018 (64 in 2014, 65 in 2016, and 66 in 2018). The minimum retirement age for self-employed women was set one year higher (65 in 2014, 66 in 2016, and 67 in 2018). The law also introduced a flexible retirement band that allows individuals who choose to work beyond the Graziella Caselli and Rosa Maria Lipsi 3 Figure 1: Italian pension expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1990 to 2014 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 199","PeriodicalId":34968,"journal":{"name":"Vienna Yearbook of Population Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Survival inequalities and redistribution in the Italian pension system\",\"authors\":\"G. 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The gap between the LCFs and the factors obtained by allowing for differential survival across gender and socio-demographic groups (CFs) gives us a means of making a quantitative assessment of the implicit redistributive impacts of the annuity redistribution from individuals with a lower life expectancy to individuals with a higher life expectancy. 1 Italian pension reform: an introduction Since the mid-1970s, the demographic behaviour of Italians has undergone profound changes that have modified the population dynamics of the country both directly and indirectly, and have thus had significant consequences for various aspects of social and economic life in Italy. The slow but inexorable shift in the demographic profile of Italy has been caused by declining fertility on the one hand, and increasing survival on the other. It is generally understood that when the ∗ Graziella Caselli (corresponding author), Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Statistical Sciences, Viale Regina Elena 295, 00161, Rome, Italy Email: graziella.caselli@uniroma1.it Rosa Maria Lipsi, Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Italy The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbookXXXX 2 Survival inequalities and redistribution in the Italian pension system younger cohorts are constantly shrinking even as the older cohorts are expanding, the population will age. In 2016, Italy and Germany were the European countries with the highest shares of the population aged 65 or older: 21.9 per cent for Italy and 21.2 per cent for Germany. This figure for Italy seems even more significant if we consider that it represents a population of almost 14 million, up from four million in 1951 (eight per cent of the total population). Although demographers had been issuing detailed warnings of this demographic shift since the late 1970s (Vitali 1976; Golini and Pinnelli 1983; Golini 1987), politicians were slow to realise that given the speed at which the ageing process was advancing, this shift would have an unprecedented impact on the country’s public expenditures starting around the turn of the century. It was especially difficult to persuade politicians to pay attention to pension expenditures in the years when the combined effects of the growth of the population of working ages (due to the postwar baby boom that continued into the early 1960s) and high employment levels were pouring an unprecedented surplus into the coffers of the pension system. For many years, the retirement age and the pay-as-you-go system were not a problem – indeed, the revenue generated by this system could easily cover expenditures on welfare as well. When the first worrying signs of a rapid increase in pension expenditures began to appear in the 1990s, there was still no sense of urgency among policy-makers. While some minor adjustments to the retirement system were made, more drastic interventions would be required in the future. At that time, the retirement age was raised, early retirement pensions were scaled back (early retirement was still possible for workers with 35 years of contributions, and as little as 20 in the public sector), and years of contributions were tied more closely to pension size. From 1995 onwards, a new method of calculating pension benefits – a “contribution system” that we describe in detail in this paper – was phased in (with the “1995 Dini reform”: Law of 8 August 1995, No. 335 (Table A.1, Appendix)). This system will go into full effect in 2030-35, when the baby boom generations born in the 1960s will have left the work force and become pensioners themselves. It is becoming increasingly clear that the implementation of this reform has been too gradual. While additional legislative measures aimed at reforming the retirement system were approved in 2011, pension expenditures have continued to grow at an unsustainable rate, triggering the need for a further series of pension reforms (Figure 1). Law Decree No. 201/2011 (known as the 2011 “salva Italia” decree), which included the “2011 Fornero reform” (Table A.1, Appendix), made two important changes to the retirement system. The decree brought the implementation of the “1995 Dini reform” forward many years by introducing a pro-rata contribution system for all workers starting on 1 January 2012. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

意大利的公共养老金制度是一种基于精算公平原则的固定缴款计划。退休金年金按每个退休年龄的资本化价值及法定换算系数计算。立法者在计算最低生活成本时使用的人口统计参数是普通意大利人的生存概率,不考虑性别或年龄以外的任何特征。本文的目的是从具体的转换因子(CFs)出发,分析男女之间以及不同教育水平个体之间的生存差异对养老金年金计算的影响。lcf之间的差距和通过考虑性别和社会人口群体(CFs)的生存差异而获得的因素,为我们提供了一种定量评估从预期寿命较低的个人到预期寿命较高的个人的年金再分配的隐性再分配影响的方法。意大利养恤金改革:引言自1970年代中期以来,意大利人的人口行为发生了深刻的变化,直接和间接地改变了该国的人口动态,从而对意大利社会和经济生活的各个方面产生了重大影响。意大利人口结构缓慢但不可阻挡的变化一方面是由于生育率下降,另一方面是由于存活率提高。一般理解,当* Graziella Caselli(通讯作者),罗马Sapienza大学统计科学系,Viale Regina Elena 295, 00161,意大利罗马电子邮件:graziella.caselli@uniroma1.it Rosa Maria Lipsi,意大利国家统计研究所(ISTAT),意大利本文所表达的观点和观点仅代表作者的观点和观点,并不一定反映意大利国家统计研究所(ISTAT)的观点和观点。意大利养老金制度中的生存不平等和再分配,年轻群体不断萎缩,即使老年群体在扩大,人口也将老龄化。2016年,意大利和德国是65岁及以上人口比例最高的欧洲国家:意大利为21.9%,德国为21.2%。如果我们考虑到意大利的人口从1951年的400万(占总人口的8%)增加到近1400万,这个数字就显得更加重要。尽管自20世纪70年代末以来,人口统计学家一直在发布有关这种人口变化的详细警告(维塔利1976;Golini and Pinnelli 1983;戈利尼(Golini, 1987)),但政治家们迟迟没有意识到,鉴于老龄化进程的推进速度,这种转变将从世纪之交开始对该国的公共支出产生前所未有的影响。在工作年龄人口增长(由于战后婴儿潮持续到20世纪60年代初)和高就业水平的综合影响下,养老金系统的金库出现了前所未有的盈余,在这种情况下,说服政治家关注养老金支出尤其困难。多年来,退休年龄和现收现付制度都不是问题——事实上,这个制度产生的收入也可以很容易地覆盖福利支出。20世纪90年代,当养老金支出迅速增长的第一个令人担忧的迹象开始出现时,政策制定者仍然没有紧迫感。虽然对退休制度作了一些小的调整,但今后将需要更大的干预。当时,退休年龄被提高,提前退休养老金被缩减(缴纳35年养老金的工人仍有可能提前退休,而公共部门只有20年养老金),缴纳年限与养老金规模的联系更加紧密。从1995年起,分阶段采用了一种计算养恤金福利的新方法- -我们在本文中详细描述的“缴款制度”(“1995年迪尼改革”:1995年8月8日第335号法律(表a .1,附录))。这一制度将在2030年至2035年全面生效,届时出生在20世纪60年代的婴儿潮一代将离开劳动力大军,自己也将成为养老金领取者。越来越明显的是,这项改革的实施过于缓慢。虽然2011年批准了旨在改革退休制度的其他立法措施,但养老金支出继续以不可持续的速度增长,引发了进一步一系列养老金改革的需要(图1)。2011年第201/2011号法令(称为2011年“salva Italia”法令),其中包括“2011年Fornero改革”(表a .1,附录),对退休制度进行了两项重要改革。 意大利的公共养老金制度是一种基于精算公平原则的固定缴款计划。退休金年金按每个退休年龄的资本化价值及法定换算系数计算。立法者在计算最低生活成本时使用的人口统计参数是普通意大利人的生存概率,不考虑性别或年龄以外的任何特征。本文的目的是从具体的转换因子(CFs)出发,分析男女之间以及不同教育水平个体之间的生存差异对养老金年金计算的影响。lcf之间的差距和通过考虑性别和社会人口群体(CFs)的生存差异而获得的因素,为我们提供了一种定量评估从预期寿命较低的个人到预期寿命较高的个人的年金再分配的隐性再分配影响的方法。意大利养恤金改革:引言自1970年代中期以来,意大利人的人口行为发生了深刻的变化,直接和间接地改变了该国的人口动态,从而对意大利社会和经济生活的各个方面产生了重大影响。意大利人口结构缓慢但不可阻挡的变化一方面是由于生育率下降,另一方面是由于存活率提高。一般理解,当* Graziella Caselli(通讯作者),罗马Sapienza大学统计科学系,Viale Regina Elena 295, 00161,意大利罗马电子邮件:graziella.caselli@uniroma1.it Rosa Maria Lipsi,意大利国家统计研究所(ISTAT),意大利本文所表达的观点和观点仅代表作者的观点和观点,并不一定反映意大利国家统计研究所(ISTAT)的观点和观点。意大利养老金制度中的生存不平等和再分配,年轻群体不断萎缩,即使老年群体在扩大,人口也将老龄化。2016年,意大利和德国是65岁及以上人口比例最高的欧洲国家:意大利为21.9%,德国为21.2%。如果我们考虑到意大利的人口从1951年的400万(占总人口的8%)增加到近1400万,这个数字就显得更加重要。尽管自20世纪70年代末以来,人口统计学家一直在发布有关这种人口变化的详细警告(维塔利1976;Golini and Pinnelli 1983;戈利尼(Golini, 1987)),但政治家们迟迟没有意识到,鉴于老龄化进程的推进速度,这种转变将从世纪之交开始对该国的公共支出产生前所未有的影响。在工作年龄人口增长(由于战后婴儿潮持续到20世纪60年代初)和高就业水平的综合影响下,养老金系统的金库出现了前所未有的盈余,在这种情况下,说服政治家关注养老金支出尤其困难。多年来,退休年龄和现收现付制度都不是问题——事实上,这个制度产生的收入也可以很容易地覆盖福利支出。20世纪90年代,当养老金支出迅速增长的第一个令人担忧的迹象开始出现时,政策制定者仍然没有紧迫感。虽然对退休制度作了一些小的调整,但今后将需要更大的干预。当时,退休年龄被提高,提前退休养老金被缩减(缴纳35年养老金的工人仍有可能提前退休,而公共部门只有20年养老金),缴纳年限与养老金规模的联系更加紧密。从1995年起,分阶段采用了一种计算养恤金福利的新方法- -我们在本文中详细描述的“缴款制度”(“1995年迪尼改革”:1995年8月8日第335号法律(表a .1,附录))。这一制度将在2030年至2035年全面生效,届时出生在20世纪60年代的婴儿潮一代将离开劳动力大军,自己也将成为养老金领取者。越来越明显的是,这项改革的实施过于缓慢。虽然2011年批准了旨在改革退休制度的其他立法措施,但养老金支出继续以不可持续的速度增长,引发了进一步一系列养老金改革的需要(图1)。2011年第201/2011号法令(称为2011年“salva Italia”法令),其中包括“2011年Fornero改革”(表a .1,附录),对退休制度进行了两项重要改革。 该法令将“1995迪尼改革”的实施提前了许多年,从2012年1月1日开始,对所有工人实行按比例缴费制度。该法案还将男性的最低退休年龄提高到66岁;就业女性从60岁到62岁,然后在2018年之前逐步达到66岁(2014年为64岁,2016年为65岁,2018年为66岁)。自雇女性的最低退休年龄(2014年为65岁,2016年为66岁,2018年为67岁)提前了一年。该法律还引入了一个灵活的退休范围,允许个人选择在Graziella Caselli和Rosa Maria Lipsi之外工作。图1:1990年至2014年意大利养老金支出占国内生产总值(GDP)的百分比 该法令将“1995迪尼改革”的实施提前了许多年,从2012年1月1日开始,对所有工人实行按比例缴费制度。该法案还将男性的最低退休年龄提高到66岁;就业女性从60岁到62岁,然后在2018年之前逐步达到66岁(2014年为64岁,2016年为65岁,2018年为66岁)。自雇女性的最低退休年龄(2014年为65岁,2016年为66岁,2018年为67岁)提前了一年。该法律还引入了一个灵活的退休范围,允许个人选择在Graziella Caselli和Rosa Maria Lipsi之外工作。图1:1990年至2014年意大利养老金支出占国内生产总值(GDP)的百分比
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Survival inequalities and redistribution in the Italian pension system
The public pension system in Italy is a defined contribution scheme based on the principle of actuarial fairness. The pension annuity is calculated starting from capitalised value and the Legislated Conversion Factors (LCFs) for each retirement age. The demographic parameters used by legislators in computing the LCFs are the survival probabilities of an average Italian, irrespective of gender or any characteristic except age. The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the differences in survival between men and women, and between individuals with different educational levels, on the calculation of the pension annuity, starting from the specific Conversion Factors (CFs). The gap between the LCFs and the factors obtained by allowing for differential survival across gender and socio-demographic groups (CFs) gives us a means of making a quantitative assessment of the implicit redistributive impacts of the annuity redistribution from individuals with a lower life expectancy to individuals with a higher life expectancy. 1 Italian pension reform: an introduction Since the mid-1970s, the demographic behaviour of Italians has undergone profound changes that have modified the population dynamics of the country both directly and indirectly, and have thus had significant consequences for various aspects of social and economic life in Italy. The slow but inexorable shift in the demographic profile of Italy has been caused by declining fertility on the one hand, and increasing survival on the other. It is generally understood that when the ∗ Graziella Caselli (corresponding author), Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Statistical Sciences, Viale Regina Elena 295, 00161, Rome, Italy Email: graziella.caselli@uniroma1.it Rosa Maria Lipsi, Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Italy The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). DOI: 10.1553/populationyearbookXXXX 2 Survival inequalities and redistribution in the Italian pension system younger cohorts are constantly shrinking even as the older cohorts are expanding, the population will age. In 2016, Italy and Germany were the European countries with the highest shares of the population aged 65 or older: 21.9 per cent for Italy and 21.2 per cent for Germany. This figure for Italy seems even more significant if we consider that it represents a population of almost 14 million, up from four million in 1951 (eight per cent of the total population). Although demographers had been issuing detailed warnings of this demographic shift since the late 1970s (Vitali 1976; Golini and Pinnelli 1983; Golini 1987), politicians were slow to realise that given the speed at which the ageing process was advancing, this shift would have an unprecedented impact on the country’s public expenditures starting around the turn of the century. It was especially difficult to persuade politicians to pay attention to pension expenditures in the years when the combined effects of the growth of the population of working ages (due to the postwar baby boom that continued into the early 1960s) and high employment levels were pouring an unprecedented surplus into the coffers of the pension system. For many years, the retirement age and the pay-as-you-go system were not a problem – indeed, the revenue generated by this system could easily cover expenditures on welfare as well. When the first worrying signs of a rapid increase in pension expenditures began to appear in the 1990s, there was still no sense of urgency among policy-makers. While some minor adjustments to the retirement system were made, more drastic interventions would be required in the future. At that time, the retirement age was raised, early retirement pensions were scaled back (early retirement was still possible for workers with 35 years of contributions, and as little as 20 in the public sector), and years of contributions were tied more closely to pension size. From 1995 onwards, a new method of calculating pension benefits – a “contribution system” that we describe in detail in this paper – was phased in (with the “1995 Dini reform”: Law of 8 August 1995, No. 335 (Table A.1, Appendix)). This system will go into full effect in 2030-35, when the baby boom generations born in the 1960s will have left the work force and become pensioners themselves. It is becoming increasingly clear that the implementation of this reform has been too gradual. While additional legislative measures aimed at reforming the retirement system were approved in 2011, pension expenditures have continued to grow at an unsustainable rate, triggering the need for a further series of pension reforms (Figure 1). Law Decree No. 201/2011 (known as the 2011 “salva Italia” decree), which included the “2011 Fornero reform” (Table A.1, Appendix), made two important changes to the retirement system. The decree brought the implementation of the “1995 Dini reform” forward many years by introducing a pro-rata contribution system for all workers starting on 1 January 2012. The legislation also raised the minimum retirement age to 66 for men; and from age 60 to age 62 for employed women, followed by a phase-in period to age 66 by 2018 (64 in 2014, 65 in 2016, and 66 in 2018). The minimum retirement age for self-employed women was set one year higher (65 in 2014, 66 in 2016, and 67 in 2018). The law also introduced a flexible retirement band that allows individuals who choose to work beyond the Graziella Caselli and Rosa Maria Lipsi 3 Figure 1: Italian pension expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1990 to 2014 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 199
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来源期刊
Vienna Yearbook of Population Research
Vienna Yearbook of Population Research Social Sciences-Demography
CiteScore
1.90
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期刊介绍: In Europe there is currently an increasing public awareness of the importance that demographic trends have in reshaping our societies. Concerns about possible negative consequences of population aging seem to be the major force behind this new interest in demographic research. Demographers have been pointing out the fundamental change in the age composition of European populations and its potentially serious implications for social security schemes for more than two decades but it is only now that the expected retirement of the baby boom generation has come close enough in time to appear on the radar screen of social security planners and political decision makers to be considered a real challenge and not just an academic exercise.
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