更多权利,更少收入?德国新版权法的经济分析

Michael Karas, Roland Kirstein
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引用次数: 0

摘要

德国版权法于2016年底进行了改革,目的是确保作者获得合理的金钱补偿。它提出了一种选择,即作者有权在10年的归属期后与另一家出版商协商版权转让。两阶段讨价还价模型的结果表明,拟议的版权制度实际上可能会损害作者,因为出版商可能会在合同谈判中将竞争加剧对利润的潜在损害内在化。本文还表明,随着预期竞争水平的增加,出版商对作者职业生涯的投资意愿严格降低。
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More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany
The German copyright law was reformed in the end of 2016 with the purpose of ensuring reasonable pecuniary compensation to authors. It proposes an option which entitles authors to negotiate copyright transfers with an additional publisher after a vesting period of ten years. The results of a two-stage bargaining model show that the proposed copyright system may actually harm authors, as publishers may internalize a potential impairment on profits from increased competition within contract negotiations. This paper also demonstrates that the publisher's willingness to invest into an author's career is strictly decreasing as the level of expected rivalry increases.
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CiteScore
1.30
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发文量
8
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