{"title":"司法歧视与充分诚信","authors":"Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2054645","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Hughes v. Fetter (1951), the Supreme Court ruled that state courts are ordinarily required — as a matter of the Full Faith and Credit Clause — to take jurisdiction of claims arising under sister state law, their own wishes notwithstanding. Hughes remains a foundational case for Conflict of Laws and interstate relations. It is said to embody principles that states should maximize each others’ policies, and cannot discriminate against sister state laws. This article argues that Hughes was wrong. The decision is not justified by history or precedent under the Clause, nor by a policy maximization rationale. And its nondiscrimination norm fits poorly with states’ allowable preferences for enforcement of their own law over sister-state law. Rather, states should be under a much more limited duty, grounded in a litigant’s substantive entitlement to redress, rather than a duty not to discriminate against the law of sister states. Arguments for extension of a rule of nondiscrimination against the law of other sovereigns in the choice of law, public policy, and jurisdiction-stripping settings should therefore not rely on the doubtful result in Hughes.","PeriodicalId":81162,"journal":{"name":"Emory law journal","volume":"63 1","pages":"1023"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2054645","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit\",\"authors\":\"Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2054645\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Hughes v. Fetter (1951), the Supreme Court ruled that state courts are ordinarily required — as a matter of the Full Faith and Credit Clause — to take jurisdiction of claims arising under sister state law, their own wishes notwithstanding. Hughes remains a foundational case for Conflict of Laws and interstate relations. It is said to embody principles that states should maximize each others’ policies, and cannot discriminate against sister state laws. This article argues that Hughes was wrong. The decision is not justified by history or precedent under the Clause, nor by a policy maximization rationale. And its nondiscrimination norm fits poorly with states’ allowable preferences for enforcement of their own law over sister-state law. Rather, states should be under a much more limited duty, grounded in a litigant’s substantive entitlement to redress, rather than a duty not to discriminate against the law of sister states. Arguments for extension of a rule of nondiscrimination against the law of other sovereigns in the choice of law, public policy, and jurisdiction-stripping settings should therefore not rely on the doubtful result in Hughes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":81162,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Emory law journal\",\"volume\":\"63 1\",\"pages\":\"1023\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2054645\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Emory law journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2054645\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Emory law journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2054645","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
在Hughes v. Fetter(1951)一案中,最高法院裁定,根据《完全信任与信用条款》(Full Faith and Credit Clause),州法院通常需要对姐妹州法律下产生的索赔采取管辖权,无论其自己的意愿如何。休斯仍然是法律冲突和州际关系的基础案例。据说,它体现了各州应最大限度地发挥彼此政策的原则,不能歧视姐妹州的法律。这篇文章认为休斯错了。根据该条款,这一决定既不符合历史或先例,也不符合政策最大化的基本原理。而且它的非歧视准则也不符合各州在执行自己的法律而不是姐妹州的法律时所允许的偏好。更确切地说,国家应该承担更有限的义务,以诉讼当事人获得补救的实质性权利为基础,而不是不歧视姐妹国家法律的义务。因此,在法律选择、公共政策和管辖权剥离设置方面,对其他主权国家法律的非歧视规则进行延伸的论点不应依赖于休斯案的可疑结果。
Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit
In Hughes v. Fetter (1951), the Supreme Court ruled that state courts are ordinarily required — as a matter of the Full Faith and Credit Clause — to take jurisdiction of claims arising under sister state law, their own wishes notwithstanding. Hughes remains a foundational case for Conflict of Laws and interstate relations. It is said to embody principles that states should maximize each others’ policies, and cannot discriminate against sister state laws. This article argues that Hughes was wrong. The decision is not justified by history or precedent under the Clause, nor by a policy maximization rationale. And its nondiscrimination norm fits poorly with states’ allowable preferences for enforcement of their own law over sister-state law. Rather, states should be under a much more limited duty, grounded in a litigant’s substantive entitlement to redress, rather than a duty not to discriminate against the law of sister states. Arguments for extension of a rule of nondiscrimination against the law of other sovereigns in the choice of law, public policy, and jurisdiction-stripping settings should therefore not rely on the doubtful result in Hughes.