多协调器移动边缘学习中激励学习者的Stackelberg博弈方法

IF 2.1 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI:10.1109/ICJECE.2022.3206393
Mhd Saria Allahham;Amr Mohamed;Aiman Erbad;Mohsen Guizani
{"title":"多协调器移动边缘学习中激励学习者的Stackelberg博弈方法","authors":"Mhd Saria Allahham;Amr Mohamed;Aiman Erbad;Mohsen Guizani","doi":"10.1109/ICJECE.2022.3206393","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Mobile edge learning (MEL) is a learning paradigm that enables distributed training of machine learning (ML) models over heterogeneous edge devices (e.g., IoT devices). Multiorchestrator MEL refers to the coexistence of multiple learning tasks with different datasets, each of which being governed by an orchestrator to facilitate the distributed training process. In MEL, the training performance deteriorates without the availability of sufficient training data or computing resources. Therefore, it is crucial to motivate edge devices to become learners and offer their computing resources, and either offer their private data or receive the needed data from the orchestrator and participate in the training process of a learning task. In this work, we propose an incentive mechanism, where we formulate the orchestrators-learners’ interactions as a 2-round Stackelberg game to motivate the participation of the learners. In the first round, the learners decide which learning task to get engaged in, and then in the second round, the training parameters and the amount of data for training in case of participation such that their utility is maximized. We then study the training round analytically and derive the learners’ optimal strategy. Finally, numerical experiments have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed incentive mechanism.","PeriodicalId":100619,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering","volume":"46 1","pages":"69-76"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Motivating Learners in Multiorchestrator Mobile Edge Learning: A Stackelberg Game Approach\",\"authors\":\"Mhd Saria Allahham;Amr Mohamed;Aiman Erbad;Mohsen Guizani\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICJECE.2022.3206393\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Mobile edge learning (MEL) is a learning paradigm that enables distributed training of machine learning (ML) models over heterogeneous edge devices (e.g., IoT devices). Multiorchestrator MEL refers to the coexistence of multiple learning tasks with different datasets, each of which being governed by an orchestrator to facilitate the distributed training process. In MEL, the training performance deteriorates without the availability of sufficient training data or computing resources. Therefore, it is crucial to motivate edge devices to become learners and offer their computing resources, and either offer their private data or receive the needed data from the orchestrator and participate in the training process of a learning task. In this work, we propose an incentive mechanism, where we formulate the orchestrators-learners’ interactions as a 2-round Stackelberg game to motivate the participation of the learners. In the first round, the learners decide which learning task to get engaged in, and then in the second round, the training parameters and the amount of data for training in case of participation such that their utility is maximized. We then study the training round analytically and derive the learners’ optimal strategy. Finally, numerical experiments have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed incentive mechanism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":100619,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"69-76\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9917252/\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9917252/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

移动边缘学习(MEL)是一种能够在异构边缘设备(例如物联网设备)上对机器学习(ML)模型进行分布式训练的学习范式。多协调器MEL是指多个学习任务与不同数据集共存,每个任务由一个协调器管理,以促进分布式训练过程。在MEL中,如果没有足够的训练数据或计算资源,训练性能就会恶化。因此,激励边缘设备成为学习者并提供其计算资源,提供其私人数据或从协调器接收所需数据并参与学习任务的训练过程至关重要。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种激励机制,将协调人与学习者的互动公式化为2轮Stackelberg博弈,以激励学习者的参与。在第一轮中,学习者决定参与哪项学习任务,然后在第二轮中,在参与的情况下,决定训练参数和训练数据量,以使其效用最大化。然后,我们对训练轮进行分析研究,得出学习者的最佳策略。最后,通过数值实验对所提出的激励机制的性能进行了评价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Motivating Learners in Multiorchestrator Mobile Edge Learning: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Mobile edge learning (MEL) is a learning paradigm that enables distributed training of machine learning (ML) models over heterogeneous edge devices (e.g., IoT devices). Multiorchestrator MEL refers to the coexistence of multiple learning tasks with different datasets, each of which being governed by an orchestrator to facilitate the distributed training process. In MEL, the training performance deteriorates without the availability of sufficient training data or computing resources. Therefore, it is crucial to motivate edge devices to become learners and offer their computing resources, and either offer their private data or receive the needed data from the orchestrator and participate in the training process of a learning task. In this work, we propose an incentive mechanism, where we formulate the orchestrators-learners’ interactions as a 2-round Stackelberg game to motivate the participation of the learners. In the first round, the learners decide which learning task to get engaged in, and then in the second round, the training parameters and the amount of data for training in case of participation such that their utility is maximized. We then study the training round analytically and derive the learners’ optimal strategy. Finally, numerical experiments have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed incentive mechanism.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Table of Contents Front Cover IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering Green Electricity Share Enhancement Through Rooftop Solar PV System on Institutional Sheds Enhanced Validation of Intelligent Control Algorithms in AC Microgrids
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1