国会议员在审议和投票时考虑合宪性的义务:众议院规则十二的缺陷和参议院的拟议规则

IF 2.4 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Vanderbilt Law Review Pub Date : 2013-07-14 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2296716
R. Feingold
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引用次数: 1

摘要

大多数学者对宪法解释的关注都集中在司法部门及其在我国三权分立制度中的作用上。尽管如此,宪法解释不应只在法院进行。相反,历史表明,我们的缔造者设想,国会议员、总统和法院将在解释我们的宪法方面发挥独立而重要的作用。然而,这种义务已经被削弱,以至于众议院议长约翰·博纳(John Boehner)在茶党和他的共和党同事的支持下,呼吁众议院的运作方式发生“翻天覆地的变化”,“更严格地遵守美国宪法”。为此,博纳议长修改了众议院规则XII,要求提出法案或联合决议的国会议员提供一份宪法授权声明(“CAS”),概述国会通过法案或联合决议的权力。本文根据国会宪法解释的历史、国会议员的动机和立法过程的现实,确定、解释并批判性地探讨了众议院规则中的四个关键缺陷。虽然众议院规则代表了提高国会宪法审议质量的重要一步,但它不必要地官僚主义,包容性不足,并且未能捕捉到宪法解释对所有国会议员的重要性,而不仅仅是立法的引入者。该规则还反映了一种非常有限的观念,即在立法投票时需要考虑哪些宪法问题,它完全忽视了涉及个人权利、公民自由和国会权力之外的任何其他潜在宪法问题的宪法缺陷。为了解决这些问题,本文提出了一项在参议院通过的改进规则。拟议的规则要求对所有立法进行CAS——不仅仅是法案或联合决议——但只有当立法实际获得投票时才需要CAS。此外,拟议的规则明确指出,所有国会议员——而不仅仅是介绍人——都有个人义务考虑他们所投票的立法是否符合宪法。最后,拟议的参议院规则要求CAS不仅包括有关国会第一条权力的信息,还包括解决其他可能与之相悖的宪法问题,如个人自由。
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The Obligation of Members of Congress to Consider Constitutionality While Deliberating and Voting: The Deficiencies of House Rule XII and a Proposed Rule for the Senate
Most scholarly attention on constitutional interpretation is focused on the judicial branch and its role in our system of separation of powers. Nonetheless, constitutional interpretation should not take place solely in the courts. Rather, history suggests our Framers envisioned that members of Congress, as well as the President and the courts, would have an independent and important role to play in interpreting our Constitution. Yet this obligation has eroded such that House Speaker John Boehner, with the support of the Tea Party and his Republican colleagues, called for a “sea change” in the way the House of Representatives operates, with “a closer adherence to the U.S. Constitution.” To that end, Speaker Boehner amended House Rule XII to require members of Congress who introduce bills or joint resolutions to provide a Constitutional Authority Statement (“CAS”) outlining Congress’s authority to adopt the bill or joint resolution. This Essay identifies, explains, and critically explores four key deficiencies in the House Rule in light of the history of constitutional interpretation in Congress, the incentives of members of Congress, and the realities of the legislative process. While the House Rule represents an important step in improving the quality of constitutional deliberation in Congress, it is unnecessarily bureaucratic, underinclusive, and fails to capture the importance of constitutional interpretation for all members of Congress, not just the introducers of legislation. The Rule also reflects a severely limited notion of what constitutional issues need to be considered in voting on legislation by completely ignoring constitutional infirmities involving individual rights, civil liberties, and any other potential constitutional issue aside from Congress’s authority. To address these concerns, this Essay proposes an improved rule for adoption in the Senate. The proposed rule requires a CAS for all legislation — not just bills or joint resolutions — but only when that legislation will actually receive a vote. Furthermore, the proposed rule makes it clear that all members of Congress — not just the introducer — have an individual obligation to consider the constitutionality of legislation on which they vote. Finally, the proposed Senate rule requires a CAS to include not just information about Congress’s Article I authority but also to address other possible countervailing constitutional issues, like individual liberties.
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期刊介绍: Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc is an online forum designed to advance scholarly discussion. En Banc offers professors, practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law Review. En Banc permits extended discussion of our articles in a way that maintains academic integrity and provides authors with a quicker approach to publication. When reexamining a case “en banc” an appellate court operates at its highest level, with all judges present and participating “on the bench.” We chose the name “En Banc” to capture this spirit of focused review and provide a forum for further dialogue where all can be present and participate.
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