配额与跨大西洋公司治理差异

IF 0.1 4区 社会学 Q4 LAW Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Pub Date : 2015-02-28 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2571714
V. Magnier, Darren Rosenblum
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引用次数: 10

摘要

法国对公司董事会女性比例的采用反映了欧洲越来越以利益相关者为导向的公司治理方式,这与美国形成了鲜明对比。本文讨论了公司董事会配额将如何改变法国和欧洲的公司治理。这一变化凸显了在欧洲广泛存在的一种业已确立的利益相关者企业文化,最明显的证据是董事会中存在工人代表。相比之下,美国的公司治理结构越来越以股东为中心。在欧洲国家和跨国公司的背景下,公司董事会中女性比例的激增是一个因素,将进一步将欧洲公司治理制度与美国区分开来。法国公众参与私人公司治理的悠久历史与美国自由的契约和财产制度形成鲜明对比。这些利益相关者或股东取向的历史分歧在美国是分开的,对利益相关者包容的关注仍然是一种学术活动,而法国和欧洲的治理体现了实质性的利益相关者包容。将大量妇女纳入世界最大经济体的公司管理将彻底改变资本结构和管理这些结构的管理制度。本文认为,配额可能会加剧欧洲和其他地区在利益相关者/股东公司治理方面的分歧。
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Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance
The French adoption of a corporate board quota for women reflects Europe's increasingly stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance, one that stands in marked contrast with that of the United States. This Article discusses how the corporate board quota will shift French and European corporate governance. The change accentuates an already established stakeholder corporate culture widespread in Europe, most notably evidenced by the presence of worker representation on boards. In contrast, the United States' corporate governance structure increasingly places the shareholder at its center. The proliferation of quotas for women on corporate boards in the national and transnational European contexts is a factor that will further distinguish European corporate governance regimes from those of the United States. France's extensive history of public participation in private corporate governance stands in contrast with the liberal contract and property system of the United States. These historical divergences of stakeholder or shareholder orientations stand apart in the United States, attention to stakeholder inclusion has remained an academic exercise, while French and European governance embodies substantial stakeholder inclusion. Integrating a critical mass of women into the world's largest economy's corporate management will revolutionize capital structures and the regulatory regimes that govern them. This Article argues that quotas may serve to heighten the divide between Europe and other regions on stakeholder/shareholder corporate governance.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
期刊介绍: The Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business is a student-run, student-edited publication of the Northwestern University School of Law. First published in 1979, JILB is dedicated to the analysis of transnational and international laws and their effects on private entities. The Journal’s substantive focus—private international law and business—distinguishes it from many other publications in the international field. JILB publishes three issues annually and is circulated to practitioners, professors, and libraries around the world. Articles published in the Journal are written by prominent scholars and practitioners. These articles analyze significant questions and current issues in private international law. The Journal also publishes student-written notes and comments that are of scholarly length and quality.
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