{"title":"现代班长的职务","authors":"Veronica Root Martinez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2581700","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a “Modern-Day Monitorship.�? Modern-day monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying remediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization’s efforts to resolve misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organizational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study and deliberate planning. Instead, modern-day monitorships have been employed in an ad-hoc and reactionary manner, which has resulted in repeated instances of controversy and calls for reform. Underlying these calls for reform has been an implicit assumption that broad-based rules can effectively regulate all monitorships. Yet, when tested, this assumption is found lacking. This Article traces the rise of the modern-day monitorship and, for the first time, analyzes the use of monitorships in five different contexts. The analysis demonstrates that modern-day monitorships have experienced a rapid evolution with important consequences. First, as the Apple monitorship demonstrates, this evolution has changed the manner in which courts and lawyers conceive of the appropriate boundaries and norms for court-ordered monitorships. Second, as the Penn State scandal reveals, private organizations are co-opting the use of monitorships, which may transform the nature of monitorships from a quasi-governmental enforcement mechanism to a privatized reputation remediation tool. Third, monitorships fall into different categories based on the type of remediation effort the monitorship is meant to achieve. Because these different categories necessitate different monitorship structures to achieve the goals of each monitorship, attempts to adopt universal rules governing monitorships may be misguided. In short, differences matter when evaluating monitorships.","PeriodicalId":46196,"journal":{"name":"Yale Journal on Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Modern-Day Monitorships\",\"authors\":\"Veronica Root Martinez\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2581700\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a “Modern-Day Monitorship.�? Modern-day monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying remediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization’s efforts to resolve misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organizational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study and deliberate planning. Instead, modern-day monitorships have been employed in an ad-hoc and reactionary manner, which has resulted in repeated instances of controversy and calls for reform. Underlying these calls for reform has been an implicit assumption that broad-based rules can effectively regulate all monitorships. Yet, when tested, this assumption is found lacking. This Article traces the rise of the modern-day monitorship and, for the first time, analyzes the use of monitorships in five different contexts. The analysis demonstrates that modern-day monitorships have experienced a rapid evolution with important consequences. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
当性侵丑闻震惊宾夕法尼亚州立大学时,当苹果公司被发现从事反竞争行为时,当美国银行(Bank of America)等服务机构不当取消了数十万房主的抵押品赎回权时,每个机构都进入了“现代监控”(modern Monitorship)状态。现代监测在各种情况下被用来协助各种各样的补救工作。这是因为它们为外部人士提供了一个独特的信息来源,可以了解这家受损组织解决不当行为的有效性。然而,尽管它们被用于高调和严重的组织不法行为,但它们并不是仔细研究和深思熟虑计划的产物。相反,现代的监测是以一种临时和反动的方式进行的,这导致一再出现争议和要求改革的呼声。这些要求改革的呼声背后隐含着一个假设,即基础广泛的规则能够有效地监管所有监督机构。然而,经过检验,发现这种假设是缺乏的。本文追溯了现代监控的兴起,并首次分析了监控在五种不同背景下的使用。分析表明,现代监测经历了迅速演变,产生了重要后果。首先,正如苹果公司的监控所表明的那样,这种演变改变了法院和律师对法院命令的监控的适当界限和规范的看法。其次,正如宾夕法尼亚州立大学丑闻所揭示的那样,私人组织正在吸收监督的使用,这可能会将监督的性质从准政府执法机制转变为私有化的声誉补救工具。第三,根据监督所要实现的补救工作的类型,监督可以分为不同的类别。由于这些不同的类别需要不同的监测结构来实现每次监测的目标,试图采用管理监测的普遍规则可能是错误的。简而言之,在评估监控时,差异很重要。
When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a “Modern-Day Monitorship.�? Modern-day monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying remediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization’s efforts to resolve misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organizational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study and deliberate planning. Instead, modern-day monitorships have been employed in an ad-hoc and reactionary manner, which has resulted in repeated instances of controversy and calls for reform. Underlying these calls for reform has been an implicit assumption that broad-based rules can effectively regulate all monitorships. Yet, when tested, this assumption is found lacking. This Article traces the rise of the modern-day monitorship and, for the first time, analyzes the use of monitorships in five different contexts. The analysis demonstrates that modern-day monitorships have experienced a rapid evolution with important consequences. First, as the Apple monitorship demonstrates, this evolution has changed the manner in which courts and lawyers conceive of the appropriate boundaries and norms for court-ordered monitorships. Second, as the Penn State scandal reveals, private organizations are co-opting the use of monitorships, which may transform the nature of monitorships from a quasi-governmental enforcement mechanism to a privatized reputation remediation tool. Third, monitorships fall into different categories based on the type of remediation effort the monitorship is meant to achieve. Because these different categories necessitate different monitorship structures to achieve the goals of each monitorship, attempts to adopt universal rules governing monitorships may be misguided. In short, differences matter when evaluating monitorships.