2007年澳大利亚逻辑协会年会

Pub Date : 2008-09-01 DOI:10.2178/bsl/1231081377
Greg Restall
{"title":"2007年澳大利亚逻辑协会年会","authors":"Greg Restall","doi":"10.2178/bsl/1231081377","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"s of contributed talks CONRAD ASMUS, Paraconsistency on the rocks. Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. E-mail: cmasmus@unimelb.edu.au. Can commitment to a theory of inference overflow into commitment to non-inferential theories? Specifically, does a commitment to paraconsistency (the view that the inference from a contradiction to any sentence is invalid) commit one to true contradictions? While there is no immediate reason to think so, I will show that, once we take into account the philosophy of validity, paraconsistency drives one onto the rocks of Dialetheism. PHILLIPPE BALBIANI, ALEXANDRU BALTAG, HANS VAN DITMARSCH, ANDREAS HERZIG, TOMOHIRO HOSHI AND TIAGO DE LIMA, Arbitrary announcement logic. Department of Computer Science, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand, and IRIT, Université Paul Sabatier, 118 Route de Narbonne, F-31062 Toulouse, Cedex 9, France. E-mail: hans@cs.otago.ac.nz. Public announcement logic is an extension of multi-agent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose an extension of public announcement logic, called arbitrary announcement logic, with a dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after arbitrary announcements. Intuitively, φ expresses that φ is true after an arbitrary announcement . For an example, let us work our way upwards from a concrete announcement. When c © 2008, Association for Symbolic Logic 1079-8986/08/1403-0009/$1.60","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The 2007 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic\",\"authors\":\"Greg Restall\",\"doi\":\"10.2178/bsl/1231081377\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"s of contributed talks CONRAD ASMUS, Paraconsistency on the rocks. Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. E-mail: cmasmus@unimelb.edu.au. Can commitment to a theory of inference overflow into commitment to non-inferential theories? Specifically, does a commitment to paraconsistency (the view that the inference from a contradiction to any sentence is invalid) commit one to true contradictions? While there is no immediate reason to think so, I will show that, once we take into account the philosophy of validity, paraconsistency drives one onto the rocks of Dialetheism. PHILLIPPE BALBIANI, ALEXANDRU BALTAG, HANS VAN DITMARSCH, ANDREAS HERZIG, TOMOHIRO HOSHI AND TIAGO DE LIMA, Arbitrary announcement logic. Department of Computer Science, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand, and IRIT, Université Paul Sabatier, 118 Route de Narbonne, F-31062 Toulouse, Cedex 9, France. E-mail: hans@cs.otago.ac.nz. Public announcement logic is an extension of multi-agent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose an extension of public announcement logic, called arbitrary announcement logic, with a dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after arbitrary announcements. Intuitively, φ expresses that φ is true after an arbitrary announcement . For an example, let us work our way upwards from a concrete announcement. When c © 2008, Association for Symbolic Logic 1079-8986/08/1403-0009/$1.60\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"100\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1231081377\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1231081377","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

康拉德•阿斯姆斯,“超一致性”触礁。墨尔本大学哲学系,澳大利亚维多利亚3010。电子邮件:cmasmus@unimelb.edu.au。对推理理论的承诺是否会溢出到对非推理理论的承诺?具体来说,对副一致性的承诺(认为从矛盾到任何句子的推理是无效的观点)会使人陷入真正的矛盾吗?虽然没有直接的理由这样认为,但我将表明,一旦我们考虑到有效性哲学,超一致性将把一个人推向Dialetheism的岩石。PHILLIPPE BALBIANI, ALEXANDRU BALTAG, HANS VAN DITMARSCH, ANDREAS HERZIG, TOMOHIRO HOSHI和TIAGO DE LIMA,任意公告逻辑。奥塔哥大学计算机科学系,新西兰达尼丁9054邮政信箱56号;保罗萨巴蒂尔大学信息技术学院,纳波恩路118号,F-31062图卢兹,Cedex 9,法国。电子邮件:hans@cs.otago.ac.nz。公共公告逻辑是多智能体认知逻辑的扩展,采用动态算子对公告对整个智能体组的信息后果进行建模。我们提出了一种公共公告逻辑的扩展,称为任意公告逻辑,它使用动态模态运算符来表示任意公告后的真实情况。直观地说,φ表示在任意公告之后φ为真。举个例子,让我们从一个具体的公告开始。When c©2008,Association for Symbolic Logic 1079-8986/08/1403-0009/$1.60
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
The 2007 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic
s of contributed talks CONRAD ASMUS, Paraconsistency on the rocks. Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. E-mail: cmasmus@unimelb.edu.au. Can commitment to a theory of inference overflow into commitment to non-inferential theories? Specifically, does a commitment to paraconsistency (the view that the inference from a contradiction to any sentence is invalid) commit one to true contradictions? While there is no immediate reason to think so, I will show that, once we take into account the philosophy of validity, paraconsistency drives one onto the rocks of Dialetheism. PHILLIPPE BALBIANI, ALEXANDRU BALTAG, HANS VAN DITMARSCH, ANDREAS HERZIG, TOMOHIRO HOSHI AND TIAGO DE LIMA, Arbitrary announcement logic. Department of Computer Science, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand, and IRIT, Université Paul Sabatier, 118 Route de Narbonne, F-31062 Toulouse, Cedex 9, France. E-mail: hans@cs.otago.ac.nz. Public announcement logic is an extension of multi-agent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose an extension of public announcement logic, called arbitrary announcement logic, with a dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after arbitrary announcements. Intuitively, φ expresses that φ is true after an arbitrary announcement . For an example, let us work our way upwards from a concrete announcement. When c © 2008, Association for Symbolic Logic 1079-8986/08/1403-0009/$1.60
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1