赔偿与公平:不当得利原则分析

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Texas Law Review Pub Date : 2001-10-02 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.285563
Emily L. Sherwin
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引用次数: 24

摘要

据说,赔偿法律体现了一项反对不正当致富的原则:一个人不应该以牺牲另一个人的利益为代价而不公正地致富。本文研究的是反对不当得利的原则及其与“衡平法”的关系。反对不当得利的原则至少可以从三个方面来理解。首先,它可以被解释为亚里士多德衡平法的一项原则,在通常健全的规则在特定情况下产生不公正的结果时提供纠正。其次,反对不当得利的原则可以被定性为一项包含广泛正义理想的“法律原则”,法院可以从中推断出特定赔偿问题的解决办法。最后,该原则可以简单地理解为表达了赔偿案件的共同主题;在这种观点下,不当得利是一个描述性和组织性的概念,对司法决策没有直接作用。前两种解释将不当得利,以及因此而产生的赔偿法律与衡平法联系在一起。第三种观点并不意味着与其他法律领域不同,赔偿与衡平法之间有特殊的联系。文章的结论是,不应将恢复原状与亚里士多德的衡平法混淆,因为恢复原状既不独特,也不为所有恢复原状的实例所共有,没有任何理由使法院比其他法律领域更不尊重规则。尽管对反对不当得利原则的第二种解释(法院可以从中推断结果的原则)更为合理,但将像不当得利这样模糊的概念赋予权威的法律地位似乎是不明智的。因此,第三种解释是最有吸引力的。
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Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment
The law of restitution is said to embody a principle against unjust enrichment: one person should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. This article is a study of the principle against unjust enrichment and its connection, if any, to "equity." The principle against unjust enrichment can be understood in at least three ways. First, it can be interpreted as a principle of Aristotelian equity, providing correction when normally sound rules produce unjust results in particular cases. Second, the principle against unjust enrichment can be characterized as a "legal principle" incorporating a broad ideal of justice, from which courts can deduce solutions to particular restitution problems. Finally, the principle can be understood simply as expressing a common theme of restitution cases; on this view, unjust enrichment is a descriptive and organizational concept, which plays no direct role in judicial decision-making. The first two interpretations associate unjust enrichment, and hence the law of restitution, with equity. The third view does not imply a special affinity between restitution and equity, in contrast to other areas of law. The article concludes that restitution should not be confused with Aristotelian equity, because there is nothing both unique to restitution and common to all instances of restitution that justifies courts in according less respect to rules than they would in other areas of law. Although the second interpretation of the principle against unjust enrichment, as a principle from which courts can deduce outcomes, is more plausible, it seems unwise to confer authoritative legal status to a notion as vague as unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the third interpretation is the most appealing.
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CiteScore
1.40
自引率
6.20%
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期刊介绍: The Texas Law Review is a national and international leader in legal scholarship. Texas Law Review is an independent journal, edited and published entirely by students at the University of Texas School of Law. Our seven issues per year contain articles by professors, judges, and practitioners; reviews of important recent books from recognized experts, essays, commentaries; and student written notes. Texas Law Review is currently the ninth most cited legal periodical in federal and state cases in the United States and the thirteenth most cited by legal journals.
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