{"title":"健康保险公司的助推","authors":"W. Epstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3009823","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Lawmakers are looking for Obamacare savings in the wrong place. Removing sick people from risk pools or reducing health plan benefits — the focus of lawmakers’ attention — would harm vulnerable populations. Instead, reform should target the $750 billion worth of unnecessary care prescribed by doctors, consented to by patients, and paid for by insurers. This Article unravels the mystery of why the insurance market has failed to excise this waste on its own. A toxic combination of mismatched legal incentives, market failures, and industry norms, means that the insurance market cannot solve the problem absent intervention. But a simple nudge could help: steering decision-makers away from unnecessary care while protecting the autonomy of doctors and patients. Insurers should require by contract that providers receive an automated warning before ordering commonly overused interventions. Such computer-driven nudges have been effective in other contexts and would reduce premiums without resorting to the means currently being explored. Because insurers lack appropriate incentives to nudge, the law must mandate it.","PeriodicalId":47124,"journal":{"name":"Southern California Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Health Insurer Nudge\",\"authors\":\"W. Epstein\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3009823\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Lawmakers are looking for Obamacare savings in the wrong place. Removing sick people from risk pools or reducing health plan benefits — the focus of lawmakers’ attention — would harm vulnerable populations. Instead, reform should target the $750 billion worth of unnecessary care prescribed by doctors, consented to by patients, and paid for by insurers. This Article unravels the mystery of why the insurance market has failed to excise this waste on its own. A toxic combination of mismatched legal incentives, market failures, and industry norms, means that the insurance market cannot solve the problem absent intervention. But a simple nudge could help: steering decision-makers away from unnecessary care while protecting the autonomy of doctors and patients. Insurers should require by contract that providers receive an automated warning before ordering commonly overused interventions. Such computer-driven nudges have been effective in other contexts and would reduce premiums without resorting to the means currently being explored. Because insurers lack appropriate incentives to nudge, the law must mandate it.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47124,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Southern California Law Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Southern California Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009823\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Southern California Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009823","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Lawmakers are looking for Obamacare savings in the wrong place. Removing sick people from risk pools or reducing health plan benefits — the focus of lawmakers’ attention — would harm vulnerable populations. Instead, reform should target the $750 billion worth of unnecessary care prescribed by doctors, consented to by patients, and paid for by insurers. This Article unravels the mystery of why the insurance market has failed to excise this waste on its own. A toxic combination of mismatched legal incentives, market failures, and industry norms, means that the insurance market cannot solve the problem absent intervention. But a simple nudge could help: steering decision-makers away from unnecessary care while protecting the autonomy of doctors and patients. Insurers should require by contract that providers receive an automated warning before ordering commonly overused interventions. Such computer-driven nudges have been effective in other contexts and would reduce premiums without resorting to the means currently being explored. Because insurers lack appropriate incentives to nudge, the law must mandate it.
期刊介绍:
Established in 1927, the Southern California Law Review is an independent and autonomous entity. Matters of policy, procedure and content are determined solely by the Editorial Board. All decision making authority is delegated by the Dean of the law school to the Editor-in-Chief. The EIC, in turn, delegates various responsibilities to the Editorial Board and the Staff. Each year the Law Review publishes one volume, which is produced in six separate issues. Each issue normally contains several articles written by outside contributors and several notes written by Southern California Law Review staff members.