印度证券欺诈集体诉讼:集体仲裁是解决之道吗?

IF 0.1 4区 社会学 Q4 LAW Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3552125
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas
{"title":"印度证券欺诈集体诉讼:集体仲裁是解决之道吗?","authors":"Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3552125","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, the 2013 law enacted a public financing regime for securities fraud class actions and it is possible third-party financing will be permitted; these mechanisms may make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of contingency fees. It is still too early to tell.","PeriodicalId":51878,"journal":{"name":"Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business","volume":"40 1","pages":"203"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration the Answer?\",\"authors\":\"Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3552125\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, the 2013 law enacted a public financing regime for securities fraud class actions and it is possible third-party financing will be permitted; these mechanisms may make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of contingency fees. It is still too early to tell.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51878,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"203\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3552125\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3552125","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

2013年,印度制定了世界上最健全的证券欺诈私人执法制度之一。与大多数其他国家不同,印度股东现在可以自己提起证券欺诈诉讼,代表所有其他被欺诈的股东,除非这些股东明确选择退出,并为整个群体收取赔偿金。唯一缺少的是一个更好的融资机制:与美国、加拿大和澳大利亚不同,印度不允许收取应急费用,因此集体诉讼律师不能以收取一定比例的赔偿来支付诉讼费用。另一方面,2013年的法律制定了针对证券欺诈集体诉讼的公共融资机制,第三方融资可能会被允许;这些机制可以弥补由于缺乏应急费用而造成的有效性损失。现在下结论还为时过早。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration the Answer?
In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, the 2013 law enacted a public financing regime for securities fraud class actions and it is possible third-party financing will be permitted; these mechanisms may make up some of the loss in effectiveness caused by the lack of contingency fees. It is still too early to tell.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
期刊介绍: The Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business is a student-run, student-edited publication of the Northwestern University School of Law. First published in 1979, JILB is dedicated to the analysis of transnational and international laws and their effects on private entities. The Journal’s substantive focus—private international law and business—distinguishes it from many other publications in the international field. JILB publishes three issues annually and is circulated to practitioners, professors, and libraries around the world. Articles published in the Journal are written by prominent scholars and practitioners. These articles analyze significant questions and current issues in private international law. The Journal also publishes student-written notes and comments that are of scholarly length and quality.
期刊最新文献
The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration the Answer? Poor States or Poor Governance? Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging Countries Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China and the West & Implications for Commercial Dispute
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1