{"title":"宪法边界的渗透性","authors":"G. Jacobsohn","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvjsf46j.7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"[T]he science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which with all its defects, redundancies, and errors is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns . . . . I. Introduction: Transnational Jurisprudence and the Challenge to Comparative Constitutional Theory \"[I]rrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.\"2 These words of Justice Antonin Scalia are hardly reassuring to those of us who study and write about some of these practices, believing perhaps that the justice and his colleagues might benefit in some small way from what we have learned from our travels and reflection. To be sure, the fact that Justice Scalia's sentiment was voiced in the course of questioning the appropriateness of another Justice's invocation of foreign experience suggests that there may actually be some judicial receptivity to comparative insights and findings. But that only begs the question of why there should be. The question came up again on the last day of the 2002 Supreme Court term when, in his opinion for the Court striking down a Texas homosexual sodomy statute, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in support of the majority's holding in the case.3 \"The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.\"4 In response, Justice Scalia dismissed \"[t]he Court's discussion of these foreign views\" as \"meaningless,\" but \"[d]angerous dicta,\"5 repeating the now familiar refrain that \"this Court. . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.\"6 Given the momentousness of the legal change wrought by the decision, this exchange received only a passing glance in the extensive commentary immediately following its announcement. It has since received more attention; Robert Bork, for example, has cited the references to foreign sources in Lawrence v. Texas (along with Grutter v. Bollinger)7 as episodes in an \"absurd turn in our jurisprudence\" that reflects the arrogance of power of the modern judiciary.8 \"[E]ven Scalia at his gloomiest probably did not foresee [how a new Constitution] might be designed bit by bit from European, Asian, and African models.\"9 In a recent book, he connects this jurisprudential turn with one of his longstanding concerns, \"the transnational culture war.\"10 Along similar lines, Ken Kersch discovered in the \"seemingly benign references\" to foreign sources \"a vast and ongoing intellectual project,\" part of a \"sophisticated effort to transform American constitutional law and its interpretation.\"\" As a result, \"[e]ventually, and possibly sooner than we think, the nature and path of American constitutional development will be radically altered.\"12 These reactions may very well exaggerate the influence of external sources in the outcomes of these cases, and arguably they overstate the broader jurisprudential significance of the infusion from abroad. They do, however, address an important issue concerning the role of constitutional theory in comparative law. The specific problem that concerns me is suggested in Justice Scalia's objection to the judicial deployment of comparative examples by the Court in overturning the controversial ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.13 That case withheld the status of the fundamental right to consensual sexual relations between homosexuals (as well as others who perform acts of sodomy in their intimate associations) on the ground that the behavior in question was not \"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\"14 This provoked Justice Scalia to underscore the words \"this Nation's\" and to observe that the Bowers majority opinion, contrary to the implication in Justice Kennedy's opinion, had not relied on \"values we share with a wider civilization.\"15 His own implication was that, in contrast with Lawrence, the strength of Bowers was evident in the local ingredients that went into its making. …","PeriodicalId":47670,"journal":{"name":"Texas Law Review","volume":"82 1","pages":"1763-1818"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2004-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The permeability of constitutional borders\",\"authors\":\"G. Jacobsohn\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/j.ctvjsf46j.7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"[T]he science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which with all its defects, redundancies, and errors is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns . . . . I. Introduction: Transnational Jurisprudence and the Challenge to Comparative Constitutional Theory \\\"[I]rrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.\\\"2 These words of Justice Antonin Scalia are hardly reassuring to those of us who study and write about some of these practices, believing perhaps that the justice and his colleagues might benefit in some small way from what we have learned from our travels and reflection. To be sure, the fact that Justice Scalia's sentiment was voiced in the course of questioning the appropriateness of another Justice's invocation of foreign experience suggests that there may actually be some judicial receptivity to comparative insights and findings. But that only begs the question of why there should be. The question came up again on the last day of the 2002 Supreme Court term when, in his opinion for the Court striking down a Texas homosexual sodomy statute, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in support of the majority's holding in the case.3 \\\"The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.\\\"4 In response, Justice Scalia dismissed \\\"[t]he Court's discussion of these foreign views\\\" as \\\"meaningless,\\\" but \\\"[d]angerous dicta,\\\"5 repeating the now familiar refrain that \\\"this Court. . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.\\\"6 Given the momentousness of the legal change wrought by the decision, this exchange received only a passing glance in the extensive commentary immediately following its announcement. It has since received more attention; Robert Bork, for example, has cited the references to foreign sources in Lawrence v. Texas (along with Grutter v. Bollinger)7 as episodes in an \\\"absurd turn in our jurisprudence\\\" that reflects the arrogance of power of the modern judiciary.8 \\\"[E]ven Scalia at his gloomiest probably did not foresee [how a new Constitution] might be designed bit by bit from European, Asian, and African models.\\\"9 In a recent book, he connects this jurisprudential turn with one of his longstanding concerns, \\\"the transnational culture war.\\\"10 Along similar lines, Ken Kersch discovered in the \\\"seemingly benign references\\\" to foreign sources \\\"a vast and ongoing intellectual project,\\\" part of a \\\"sophisticated effort to transform American constitutional law and its interpretation.\\\"\\\" As a result, \\\"[e]ventually, and possibly sooner than we think, the nature and path of American constitutional development will be radically altered.\\\"12 These reactions may very well exaggerate the influence of external sources in the outcomes of these cases, and arguably they overstate the broader jurisprudential significance of the infusion from abroad. They do, however, address an important issue concerning the role of constitutional theory in comparative law. The specific problem that concerns me is suggested in Justice Scalia's objection to the judicial deployment of comparative examples by the Court in overturning the controversial ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.13 That case withheld the status of the fundamental right to consensual sexual relations between homosexuals (as well as others who perform acts of sodomy in their intimate associations) on the ground that the behavior in question was not \\\"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.\\\"14 This provoked Justice Scalia to underscore the words \\\"this Nation's\\\" and to observe that the Bowers majority opinion, contrary to the implication in Justice Kennedy's opinion, had not relied on \\\"values we share with a wider civilization.\\\"15 His own implication was that, in contrast with Lawrence, the strength of Bowers was evident in the local ingredients that went into its making. …\",\"PeriodicalId\":47670,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Texas Law Review\",\"volume\":\"82 1\",\"pages\":\"1763-1818\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"20\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Texas Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjsf46j.7\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Texas Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjsf46j.7","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
摘要
法理学是人类智慧的骄傲,尽管它有缺陷、冗余和错误,但它是多年来积累起来的理性,它将原始正义的原则与人类关注的无限多样性结合在一起. . . .“‘世界共同体’的实践是不相关的,它的正义观念(谢天谢地)并不总是我们人民的。”大法官安东宁·斯卡利亚(Antonin Scalia)的这些话很难让我们这些研究和撰写其中一些做法的人放心,因为我们相信,也许大法官和他的同事们可能会从我们从旅行和反思中学到的东西中得到一些小小的好处。可以肯定的是,斯卡利亚大法官的观点是在质疑另一位大法官援引外国经验的适当性的过程中表达出来的,这一事实表明,司法上实际上可能对比较的见解和发现有一定的接受能力。但这只是回避了为什么会有这样的问题。在2002年最高法院任期的最后一天,这个问题再次被提了出来。当时,大法官安东尼·肯尼迪(Anthony Kennedy)在他对法院推翻德克萨斯州同性恋鸡奸法的意见中,引用了欧洲人权法院(European Court of Human Rights)的几项裁决,以支持多数法官对该案的裁决。3 .“在许多其他国家,请愿者在本案中寻求的权利已被接受为人类自由的一个组成部分。”作为回应,斯卡利亚法官驳回了“最高法院对这些外国观点的讨论”,认为这是“毫无意义的”,但却是“危险的指令”,并重复了现在熟悉的重复:“本院……不应该把外国的情绪、风尚或时尚强加给美国人。考虑到这一决定所带来的重大法律变化,在该决定宣布后立即出现的大量评论中,人们对这一交流只是匆匆一瞥。从那以后,它得到了更多的关注;例如,罗伯特·博克(Robert Bork)在劳伦斯诉德克萨斯州案(以及格鲁特诉博林格案)7中引用了外国资料,认为这是“我们法理学的荒谬转折”,反映了现代司法机构权力的傲慢。“即使是斯卡利亚在他最悲观的时候也可能没有预见到[新宪法]将如何一点点地从欧洲、亚洲和非洲的模式中设计出来。”在最近的一本书中,他将这种法学转向与他长期关注的问题之一“跨国文化战争”联系起来。沿着类似的思路,肯·克什(Ken Kersch)在对外国资料的“看似善意的引用”中发现了“一个庞大而正在进行的智力工程”,是“改变美国宪法及其解释的复杂努力”的一部分。因此,“最终,可能比我们想象的要早,美国宪法发展的性质和道路将彻底改变。”12 .这些反应很可能夸大了外部来源对这些案件结果的影响,而且可以说,它们夸大了国外资金注入的更广泛的法理意义。然而,它们确实解决了宪法理论在比较法中的作用这一重要问题。在推翻鲍尔斯诉哈德威克(Bowers v. hardwick)一案中有争议的裁决时,斯卡利亚大法官反对法院采用比较案例。该案保留了同性恋者(以及其他在亲密交往中实施鸡奸行为的人)双方自愿发生性关系的基本权利的地位,理由是所涉行为并非“深深扎根于这个国家的历史和文化中”传统。”这促使斯卡利亚大法官强调了“这个国家的”一词,并指出,与肯尼迪大法官意见的含义相反,鲍尔斯的多数意见并没有建立在“我们与更广泛的文明共有的价值观”的基础上。他自己的意思是,与劳伦斯不同的是,鲍尔斯的实力明显体现在其制作所用的当地原料上。...
[T]he science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which with all its defects, redundancies, and errors is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns . . . . I. Introduction: Transnational Jurisprudence and the Challenge to Comparative Constitutional Theory "[I]rrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people."2 These words of Justice Antonin Scalia are hardly reassuring to those of us who study and write about some of these practices, believing perhaps that the justice and his colleagues might benefit in some small way from what we have learned from our travels and reflection. To be sure, the fact that Justice Scalia's sentiment was voiced in the course of questioning the appropriateness of another Justice's invocation of foreign experience suggests that there may actually be some judicial receptivity to comparative insights and findings. But that only begs the question of why there should be. The question came up again on the last day of the 2002 Supreme Court term when, in his opinion for the Court striking down a Texas homosexual sodomy statute, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in support of the majority's holding in the case.3 "The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries."4 In response, Justice Scalia dismissed "[t]he Court's discussion of these foreign views" as "meaningless," but "[d]angerous dicta,"5 repeating the now familiar refrain that "this Court. . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."6 Given the momentousness of the legal change wrought by the decision, this exchange received only a passing glance in the extensive commentary immediately following its announcement. It has since received more attention; Robert Bork, for example, has cited the references to foreign sources in Lawrence v. Texas (along with Grutter v. Bollinger)7 as episodes in an "absurd turn in our jurisprudence" that reflects the arrogance of power of the modern judiciary.8 "[E]ven Scalia at his gloomiest probably did not foresee [how a new Constitution] might be designed bit by bit from European, Asian, and African models."9 In a recent book, he connects this jurisprudential turn with one of his longstanding concerns, "the transnational culture war."10 Along similar lines, Ken Kersch discovered in the "seemingly benign references" to foreign sources "a vast and ongoing intellectual project," part of a "sophisticated effort to transform American constitutional law and its interpretation."" As a result, "[e]ventually, and possibly sooner than we think, the nature and path of American constitutional development will be radically altered."12 These reactions may very well exaggerate the influence of external sources in the outcomes of these cases, and arguably they overstate the broader jurisprudential significance of the infusion from abroad. They do, however, address an important issue concerning the role of constitutional theory in comparative law. The specific problem that concerns me is suggested in Justice Scalia's objection to the judicial deployment of comparative examples by the Court in overturning the controversial ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.13 That case withheld the status of the fundamental right to consensual sexual relations between homosexuals (as well as others who perform acts of sodomy in their intimate associations) on the ground that the behavior in question was not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."14 This provoked Justice Scalia to underscore the words "this Nation's" and to observe that the Bowers majority opinion, contrary to the implication in Justice Kennedy's opinion, had not relied on "values we share with a wider civilization."15 His own implication was that, in contrast with Lawrence, the strength of Bowers was evident in the local ingredients that went into its making. …
期刊介绍:
The Texas Law Review is a national and international leader in legal scholarship. Texas Law Review is an independent journal, edited and published entirely by students at the University of Texas School of Law. Our seven issues per year contain articles by professors, judges, and practitioners; reviews of important recent books from recognized experts, essays, commentaries; and student written notes. Texas Law Review is currently the ninth most cited legal periodical in federal and state cases in the United States and the thirteenth most cited by legal journals.