{"title":"建立和毁灭国家。现代非洲的战争、领导与种族灭绝(斯科特·斯特劳斯著)","authors":"Thomas Kühne","doi":"10.3138/GSI.10.2.07","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Scott Straus, a sociologist at the University of Madison in Wisconsin, is well known to genocide scholars for his brilliant, theoretically ambitious, and empirically rich first book, The Order of Genocide. Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, on the mindset of perpetrators and the local dynamic of mass violence in Rwanda. His latest work, Making and Unmaking Nations, stays in sub-Saharan Africa and continues to inquire in to the genealogy of genocide, but does so in a rather different way. It shifts from local actors to national elites, provides in-depths comparisons of five countries, and eventually seeks an answer to the question of why genocide happens by, paradoxically, examining ‘‘why genocide does not happen.’’ (ix). This is an innovative contribution to the field. Straus’ comparative endeavor is not limited to cases of genocide—Rwanda, Darfur—but also draws attention to three countries—Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire— that at some point were at the brink of genocide but ultimately managed to avoid it. The five case studies consider a broad specter of possible factors for genocide— colonial baggage, political continuities and discontinuities since decolonization, economic growths and declines, demographic, social, and ethnic structures, and not least political and military interventions from outside. Eventually, however, Straus tells us that it is ideologies and ideas—or ‘‘founding narratives’’—and the way these inform the strategies, tactics, and decisions of political leaders that matter more than anything else. Founding narratives are, according to Straus, those mythically framed national ideologies that define who is in and who is out, or who rules and who is ruled—ideologies that establish hierarchies between primary and secondary citizens and juxtapose the ‘good,’ statesupporting part of the population and the ‘evil’ part that is blamed for undermining and destroying the state. While national ideologies of this sort may be encountered and inform violence in many states, including the ones examined in this book, the step towards genocide is taken only if the outsider-group is constructed as an ‘‘unwinnable collective identity category’’ (276) because it is perceived as ‘‘inherently dangerous’’ and ‘‘uncontrollable and uncontainable’’ (26, 33) so that cooperation or negotiation are no longer options. This was the case with the Tutsis, according to the ethnic imagery of the Hutus. The Tutsis were suspected of working to overthrow the Hutus and return to oppressing the Hutus as they had in the colonial and postcolonial past. And it is this construction of ideologies and their appropriation by political actors that lead, or do not lead, to genocide, as Straus asserts throughout the book, not only with regard to Rwanda. The political actors decide which narrative they appropriate and deploy, and how to adjust those narratives in order to perpetrate genocide or not. Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal provide examples of rather different, in fact opposite, founding narratives. The drift toward massive violence against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire for instance, as witnessed in the 2000s and from 2010 to 2011, could be associated with the onset of genocide and was embedded in an exclusionist nationalist ideology as well as a ‘‘crystallized anti-foreigner, anti-northerner, and anti-Muslim sentiment in the southern and western parts of the country’’ (123). 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His latest work, Making and Unmaking Nations, stays in sub-Saharan Africa and continues to inquire in to the genealogy of genocide, but does so in a rather different way. It shifts from local actors to national elites, provides in-depths comparisons of five countries, and eventually seeks an answer to the question of why genocide happens by, paradoxically, examining ‘‘why genocide does not happen.’’ (ix). This is an innovative contribution to the field. Straus’ comparative endeavor is not limited to cases of genocide—Rwanda, Darfur—but also draws attention to three countries—Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire— that at some point were at the brink of genocide but ultimately managed to avoid it. The five case studies consider a broad specter of possible factors for genocide— colonial baggage, political continuities and discontinuities since decolonization, economic growths and declines, demographic, social, and ethnic structures, and not least political and military interventions from outside. Eventually, however, Straus tells us that it is ideologies and ideas—or ‘‘founding narratives’’—and the way these inform the strategies, tactics, and decisions of political leaders that matter more than anything else. Founding narratives are, according to Straus, those mythically framed national ideologies that define who is in and who is out, or who rules and who is ruled—ideologies that establish hierarchies between primary and secondary citizens and juxtapose the ‘good,’ statesupporting part of the population and the ‘evil’ part that is blamed for undermining and destroying the state. While national ideologies of this sort may be encountered and inform violence in many states, including the ones examined in this book, the step towards genocide is taken only if the outsider-group is constructed as an ‘‘unwinnable collective identity category’’ (276) because it is perceived as ‘‘inherently dangerous’’ and ‘‘uncontrollable and uncontainable’’ (26, 33) so that cooperation or negotiation are no longer options. This was the case with the Tutsis, according to the ethnic imagery of the Hutus. The Tutsis were suspected of working to overthrow the Hutus and return to oppressing the Hutus as they had in the colonial and postcolonial past. And it is this construction of ideologies and their appropriation by political actors that lead, or do not lead, to genocide, as Straus asserts throughout the book, not only with regard to Rwanda. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
斯科特·斯特劳斯是威斯康辛州麦迪逊大学的社会学家,他的第一本书《种族灭绝的秩序》在研究种族灭绝的学者中很有名,这本书在理论上雄心勃勃,而且经验丰富。《卢旺达的种族、权力和战争》,关于卢旺达行凶者的心态和大规模暴力的当地动态。他的最新作品《建立与毁灭国家》(Making and Unmaking Nations)停留在撒哈拉以南的非洲,继续探究种族灭绝的谱系,但以一种相当不同的方式进行。它从地方行动者转向国家精英,提供了五个国家的深入比较,并最终通过检验“为什么种族灭绝没有发生”来寻找种族灭绝为什么发生的问题的答案,这是自相矛盾的。“这是对该领域的创新贡献。斯特劳斯的比较努力并不局限于种族灭绝的案例——卢旺达、达尔富尔——还引起了人们对三个国家——塞内加尔、马里、Côte科特迪瓦——的关注,这些国家一度处于种族灭绝的边缘,但最终成功避免了种族灭绝。这五个案例研究考虑了种族灭绝的可能因素——殖民包袱、非殖民化以来的政治连续性和不连续性、经济增长和衰退、人口、社会和种族结构,尤其是来自外部的政治和军事干预。然而,最终,斯特劳斯告诉我们,意识形态和理念——或“建国叙事”——以及它们为政治领导人的战略、战术和决策提供信息的方式比其他任何事情都重要。根据施特劳斯的说法,建国叙事是那些神话般的国家意识形态,定义了谁在谁不在,或者谁统治谁被统治——这些意识形态在初级公民和次级公民之间建立了等级制度,并将支持国家的“好”部分与被指责破坏和摧毁国家的“邪恶”部分并列在一起。虽然这种民族意识形态可能会在许多国家(包括本书所研究的国家)遇到并引发暴力,但只有当外部群体被构建为“无法获胜的集体认同类别”(276)时,才会采取种族灭绝的步骤,因为它被认为是“固有的危险”和“无法控制和无法遏制的”(26,33),因此合作或谈判不再是选择。根据胡图族的民族形象,图西人就是这种情况。图西人被怀疑试图推翻胡图人,并像他们在殖民和后殖民时期那样重新压迫胡图人。正是意识形态的构建以及政治角色对意识形态的挪用导致了,或者没有导致,种族灭绝,正如施特劳斯在整本书中所断言的那样,不仅仅是卢旺达。政治行为者决定他们采用和部署哪种叙事,以及如何调整这些叙事,以实施或不实施种族灭绝。Côte科特迪瓦、马里和塞内加尔提供了相当不同的,实际上是相反的建国叙事的例子。例如,在2000年代和2010年至2011年期间,在Côte科特迪瓦发生了针对平民的大规模暴力事件,这可能与种族灭绝的发生有关,并植根于排外的民族主义意识形态,以及“该国南部和西部地区明确的反外国人、反北方人和反穆斯林情绪”(123)。然而Côte科特迪瓦并没有沉没
Making and Unmaking Nations. War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa by Scott Straus (review)
Scott Straus, a sociologist at the University of Madison in Wisconsin, is well known to genocide scholars for his brilliant, theoretically ambitious, and empirically rich first book, The Order of Genocide. Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, on the mindset of perpetrators and the local dynamic of mass violence in Rwanda. His latest work, Making and Unmaking Nations, stays in sub-Saharan Africa and continues to inquire in to the genealogy of genocide, but does so in a rather different way. It shifts from local actors to national elites, provides in-depths comparisons of five countries, and eventually seeks an answer to the question of why genocide happens by, paradoxically, examining ‘‘why genocide does not happen.’’ (ix). This is an innovative contribution to the field. Straus’ comparative endeavor is not limited to cases of genocide—Rwanda, Darfur—but also draws attention to three countries—Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire— that at some point were at the brink of genocide but ultimately managed to avoid it. The five case studies consider a broad specter of possible factors for genocide— colonial baggage, political continuities and discontinuities since decolonization, economic growths and declines, demographic, social, and ethnic structures, and not least political and military interventions from outside. Eventually, however, Straus tells us that it is ideologies and ideas—or ‘‘founding narratives’’—and the way these inform the strategies, tactics, and decisions of political leaders that matter more than anything else. Founding narratives are, according to Straus, those mythically framed national ideologies that define who is in and who is out, or who rules and who is ruled—ideologies that establish hierarchies between primary and secondary citizens and juxtapose the ‘good,’ statesupporting part of the population and the ‘evil’ part that is blamed for undermining and destroying the state. While national ideologies of this sort may be encountered and inform violence in many states, including the ones examined in this book, the step towards genocide is taken only if the outsider-group is constructed as an ‘‘unwinnable collective identity category’’ (276) because it is perceived as ‘‘inherently dangerous’’ and ‘‘uncontrollable and uncontainable’’ (26, 33) so that cooperation or negotiation are no longer options. This was the case with the Tutsis, according to the ethnic imagery of the Hutus. The Tutsis were suspected of working to overthrow the Hutus and return to oppressing the Hutus as they had in the colonial and postcolonial past. And it is this construction of ideologies and their appropriation by political actors that lead, or do not lead, to genocide, as Straus asserts throughout the book, not only with regard to Rwanda. The political actors decide which narrative they appropriate and deploy, and how to adjust those narratives in order to perpetrate genocide or not. Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal provide examples of rather different, in fact opposite, founding narratives. The drift toward massive violence against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire for instance, as witnessed in the 2000s and from 2010 to 2011, could be associated with the onset of genocide and was embedded in an exclusionist nationalist ideology as well as a ‘‘crystallized anti-foreigner, anti-northerner, and anti-Muslim sentiment in the southern and western parts of the country’’ (123). Yet Côte d’Ivoire did not sink