{"title":"以商标使用为基础的商标法","authors":"Mark A. Lemley, Stacey L. Dogan","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/yn27k","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The debate over trademark use has become a hot-button issue in intellectual property (IP) law. In Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis characterize it as a dispute over whether to limit trademark holder rights in a new and unanticipated way. Yet there is another - in our view more historically accurate - way to frame the trademark use debate: the question is whether courts should, absent specific statutory authorization, allow trademark holders to assert a new and unprecedented form of trademark infringement claim. The pop-up and keyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under the guise of direct infringement suits. Dinwoodie and Janis's thorough account notwithstanding, it remains the fact that, before the recent spate of Internet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark claim of the sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringement suits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who use marks in connection with the promotion of their own goods and services. The question raised by the trademark use cases, as we view it, is whether courts should countenance a radical departure from that traditional model without specific instruction from Congress. We think they should not. In this paper, we explain the origins of trademark use doctrine in traditional limits on the scope of the trademark right and in the distinction between direct and contributory infringement. We also explain why we cannot simply rely on the likelihood of consumer confusion test to solve the problems the trademark use doctrine addresses, and we examine the difficult problem of defining the scope of the trademark use doctrine.","PeriodicalId":51610,"journal":{"name":"Iowa Law Review","volume":"92 1","pages":"1669"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"24","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use\",\"authors\":\"Mark A. Lemley, Stacey L. Dogan\",\"doi\":\"10.31235/osf.io/yn27k\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The debate over trademark use has become a hot-button issue in intellectual property (IP) law. In Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis characterize it as a dispute over whether to limit trademark holder rights in a new and unanticipated way. Yet there is another - in our view more historically accurate - way to frame the trademark use debate: the question is whether courts should, absent specific statutory authorization, allow trademark holders to assert a new and unprecedented form of trademark infringement claim. The pop-up and keyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under the guise of direct infringement suits. Dinwoodie and Janis's thorough account notwithstanding, it remains the fact that, before the recent spate of Internet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark claim of the sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringement suits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who use marks in connection with the promotion of their own goods and services. The question raised by the trademark use cases, as we view it, is whether courts should countenance a radical departure from that traditional model without specific instruction from Congress. We think they should not. In this paper, we explain the origins of trademark use doctrine in traditional limits on the scope of the trademark right and in the distinction between direct and contributory infringement. We also explain why we cannot simply rely on the likelihood of consumer confusion test to solve the problems the trademark use doctrine addresses, and we examine the difficult problem of defining the scope of the trademark use doctrine.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51610,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Iowa Law Review\",\"volume\":\"92 1\",\"pages\":\"1669\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"24\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Iowa Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/yn27k\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Iowa Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/yn27k","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
摘要
关于商标使用的争论已经成为知识产权法中的一个热点问题。格雷姆·丁伍迪(Graeme Dinwoodie)和马克·詹尼斯(Mark Janis)在《使用的困惑:商标法中的语境主义》(Confusion over Use: Contextualism In Trademark Law)一书中将其描述为是否以一种新的、意想不到的方式限制商标权的争议。然而,在我们看来,还有另一种更符合历史的方式来构建商标使用辩论:问题是,在没有具体法定授权的情况下,法院是否应该允许商标持有人提出一种新的、前所未有的商标侵权索赔。弹出式广告和关键词广告的案例都是试图在直接侵权诉讼的幌子下强加第三方责任。尽管Dinwoodie和Janis做了详尽的描述,但事实是,在最近大量与互联网相关的案件发生之前,从来没有法院认可过商标持有人现在所主张的那种商标索赔。商标侵权诉讼总是涉及当事人在宣传自己的商品和服务时使用商标的侵权指控。在我们看来,商标使用案例所提出的问题是,法院是否应该在没有国会具体指示的情况下,支持对传统模式的彻底背离。我们认为他们不应该这么做。在本文中,我们从传统的商标权范围限制和直接侵权与共同侵权的区分中解释了商标使用原则的起源。我们还解释了为什么我们不能简单地依靠消费者混淆可能性测试来解决商标使用原则所解决的问题,我们还研究了定义商标使用原则范围的难题。
The debate over trademark use has become a hot-button issue in intellectual property (IP) law. In Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis characterize it as a dispute over whether to limit trademark holder rights in a new and unanticipated way. Yet there is another - in our view more historically accurate - way to frame the trademark use debate: the question is whether courts should, absent specific statutory authorization, allow trademark holders to assert a new and unprecedented form of trademark infringement claim. The pop-up and keyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under the guise of direct infringement suits. Dinwoodie and Janis's thorough account notwithstanding, it remains the fact that, before the recent spate of Internet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark claim of the sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringement suits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who use marks in connection with the promotion of their own goods and services. The question raised by the trademark use cases, as we view it, is whether courts should countenance a radical departure from that traditional model without specific instruction from Congress. We think they should not. In this paper, we explain the origins of trademark use doctrine in traditional limits on the scope of the trademark right and in the distinction between direct and contributory infringement. We also explain why we cannot simply rely on the likelihood of consumer confusion test to solve the problems the trademark use doctrine addresses, and we examine the difficult problem of defining the scope of the trademark use doctrine.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1915 as the Iowa Law Bulletin, the Iowa Law Review has served as a scholarly legal journal, noting and analyzing developments in the law and suggesting future paths for the law to follow. Since 1935, students have edited and have managed the Law Review, which is published five times annually. The Law Review ranks high among the top “high impact” legal periodicals in the country, and its subscribers include legal practitioners and law libraries throughout the world.