反对无限制逮捕权的争论:富有表现力的第四修正案与黑人的抗议

IF 2.1 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Michigan Law Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.36644/mlr.120.8.argument
Karen Pita Loor
{"title":"反对无限制逮捕权的争论:富有表现力的第四修正案与黑人的抗议","authors":"Karen Pita Loor","doi":"10.36644/mlr.120.8.argument","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Protesting is supposed to be revered in our democracy, considered “as American as apple pie” in our nation’s mythology. But the actual experiences of the 2020 racial justice protesters showed that this supposed reverence for political dissent and protest is more akin to American folklore than reality on the streets. The images from those streets depicted police officers clad in riot gear and armed with shields, batons, and “less than” lethal weapons aggressively arresting protesters, often en masse. In the first week of the George Floyd protests, police arrested roughly 10,000 people, and approximately 78 percent of those arrests were for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses or criminal violations. Moreover, troubling figures regarding the racial breakdown of protest-related arrests, along with anecdotes from activists, suggest that just as with routine policing, the experiences of Black and white people differ during protests—even when they protest side by side—with police potentially targeting Black activists for arrest. This Article exposes how police officers’ easy access to a wide arsenal of criminal charges serves to trample on expressive freedoms and explains how a new and clearer understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s application to expressive conduct should curb the police’s seemingly unbounded power to arrest protesters. In Part I of this Article, I revisit and review the roots and rationale of the Expressive Fourth Amendment doctrine, which posits that there is an expressive component to Fourth Amendment protection. In Part II, I discuss the criminal statutes that police often use to make arrests during protests and then focus more narrowly on the arrests in New York City in the early days of the George Floyd demonstrations, including the racial makeup of arrestees. In Part III, I explain how the presiding understanding of the Fourth Amendment places minimal limits on a police officer’s ability to arrest, regardless of an individual’s engagement in expressive political conduct. Thereafter, I describe how the Expressive Fourth Amendment should apply to arrests and serve to curtail an officer’s ability to engage in warrantless arrests of protesters for nonviolent misdemeanors.","PeriodicalId":47790,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Argument Against Unbounded Arrest Power: The Expressive Fourth Amendment and Protesting While Black\",\"authors\":\"Karen Pita Loor\",\"doi\":\"10.36644/mlr.120.8.argument\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Protesting is supposed to be revered in our democracy, considered “as American as apple pie” in our nation’s mythology. But the actual experiences of the 2020 racial justice protesters showed that this supposed reverence for political dissent and protest is more akin to American folklore than reality on the streets. The images from those streets depicted police officers clad in riot gear and armed with shields, batons, and “less than” lethal weapons aggressively arresting protesters, often en masse. In the first week of the George Floyd protests, police arrested roughly 10,000 people, and approximately 78 percent of those arrests were for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses or criminal violations. Moreover, troubling figures regarding the racial breakdown of protest-related arrests, along with anecdotes from activists, suggest that just as with routine policing, the experiences of Black and white people differ during protests—even when they protest side by side—with police potentially targeting Black activists for arrest. This Article exposes how police officers’ easy access to a wide arsenal of criminal charges serves to trample on expressive freedoms and explains how a new and clearer understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s application to expressive conduct should curb the police’s seemingly unbounded power to arrest protesters. In Part I of this Article, I revisit and review the roots and rationale of the Expressive Fourth Amendment doctrine, which posits that there is an expressive component to Fourth Amendment protection. In Part II, I discuss the criminal statutes that police often use to make arrests during protests and then focus more narrowly on the arrests in New York City in the early days of the George Floyd demonstrations, including the racial makeup of arrestees. In Part III, I explain how the presiding understanding of the Fourth Amendment places minimal limits on a police officer’s ability to arrest, regardless of an individual’s engagement in expressive political conduct. Thereafter, I describe how the Expressive Fourth Amendment should apply to arrests and serve to curtail an officer’s ability to engage in warrantless arrests of protesters for nonviolent misdemeanors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47790,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Michigan Law Review\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Michigan Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.8.argument\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Michigan Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.8.argument","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

抗议在我们的民主制度中应该受到尊重,在我们国家的神话中被视为“像苹果派一样美国”。但2020年种族正义抗议者的实际经历表明,这种对政治异议和抗议的所谓尊重更像是美国的民间传说,而不是街头的现实。来自这些街道的图像显示,警察穿着防暴装备,手持盾牌、警棍和“不太”致命的武器,猛烈地逮捕抗议者,通常是集体逮捕。在乔治·弗洛伊德(George Floyd)抗议活动的第一周,警方逮捕了大约1万人,其中约78%的被捕者是非暴力轻罪或刑事犯罪。此外,有关抗议相关逮捕的种族分类的令人不安的数据,以及来自活动人士的轶事表明,就像日常警务一样,黑人和白人在抗议期间的经历也不同——即使他们肩并肩抗议,警察可能会把黑人活动人士作为逮捕目标。这篇文章揭示了警察如何轻易获得广泛的刑事指控,从而践踏了表达自由,并解释了对第四修正案适用于表达行为的新的更清晰的理解,应该如何遏制警察似乎不受限制的逮捕抗议者的权力。在本文的第一部分,我重新审视和回顾了表达性第四修正案原则的根源和基本原理,该原则假定第四修正案的保护中存在表达性成分。在第二部分中,我讨论了警察在抗议活动中经常用来逮捕的刑事法规,然后更狭隘地关注乔治·弗洛伊德示威活动早期在纽约市的逮捕,包括被捕者的种族构成。在第三部分中,我解释了对第四修正案的主要理解如何对警察的逮捕能力施加最低限度的限制,而不管个人是否参与表达政治行为。此后,我描述了富于表现力的第四修正案应该如何适用于逮捕,并限制警察对非暴力轻罪抗议者进行无证逮捕的能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
An Argument Against Unbounded Arrest Power: The Expressive Fourth Amendment and Protesting While Black
Protesting is supposed to be revered in our democracy, considered “as American as apple pie” in our nation’s mythology. But the actual experiences of the 2020 racial justice protesters showed that this supposed reverence for political dissent and protest is more akin to American folklore than reality on the streets. The images from those streets depicted police officers clad in riot gear and armed with shields, batons, and “less than” lethal weapons aggressively arresting protesters, often en masse. In the first week of the George Floyd protests, police arrested roughly 10,000 people, and approximately 78 percent of those arrests were for nonviolent misdemeanor offenses or criminal violations. Moreover, troubling figures regarding the racial breakdown of protest-related arrests, along with anecdotes from activists, suggest that just as with routine policing, the experiences of Black and white people differ during protests—even when they protest side by side—with police potentially targeting Black activists for arrest. This Article exposes how police officers’ easy access to a wide arsenal of criminal charges serves to trample on expressive freedoms and explains how a new and clearer understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s application to expressive conduct should curb the police’s seemingly unbounded power to arrest protesters. In Part I of this Article, I revisit and review the roots and rationale of the Expressive Fourth Amendment doctrine, which posits that there is an expressive component to Fourth Amendment protection. In Part II, I discuss the criminal statutes that police often use to make arrests during protests and then focus more narrowly on the arrests in New York City in the early days of the George Floyd demonstrations, including the racial makeup of arrestees. In Part III, I explain how the presiding understanding of the Fourth Amendment places minimal limits on a police officer’s ability to arrest, regardless of an individual’s engagement in expressive political conduct. Thereafter, I describe how the Expressive Fourth Amendment should apply to arrests and serve to curtail an officer’s ability to engage in warrantless arrests of protesters for nonviolent misdemeanors.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: The Michigan Law Review is a journal of legal scholarship. Eight issues are published annually. Seven of each volume"s eight issues ordinarily are composed of two major parts: Articles by legal scholars and practitioners, and Notes written by the student editors. One issue in each volume is devoted to book reviews. Occasionally, special issues are devoted to symposia or colloquia. First Impressions, the online companion to the Michigan Law Review, publishes op-ed length articles by academics, judges, and practitioners on current legal issues. This extension of the printed journal facilitates quick dissemination of the legal community’s initial impressions of important judicial decisions, legislative developments, and timely legal policy issues.
期刊最新文献
Mooting Unilateral Mootness Race-ing Antitrust Recognizing the Right to Family Unity in Immigration Law Disabling Lawyering: Buck v. Bell and the Road to a More Inclusive Legal Practice Error Aversions and Due Process
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1