{"title":"逻辑的采纳问题与相对主义","authors":"Daniel Boyd","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.389","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The adoption problem was originally raised by Saul Kripke. It is supposed to present a difficulty for Willard Van Orman Quine’s view that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. I want to argue for two things in relation to the adoption problem. The first is that the adoption problem does not really undermine the idea that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. The second is that an analogue of the adoption problem can be developed in order to criticize a form of relativism about logic.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Adoption Problem and Relativism about Logic\",\"authors\":\"Daniel Boyd\",\"doi\":\"10.36446/af.2022.389\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The adoption problem was originally raised by Saul Kripke. It is supposed to present a difficulty for Willard Van Orman Quine’s view that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. I want to argue for two things in relation to the adoption problem. The first is that the adoption problem does not really undermine the idea that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. The second is that an analogue of the adoption problem can be developed in order to criticize a form of relativism about logic.\",\"PeriodicalId\":40940,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analisis Filosofico\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analisis Filosofico\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.389\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analisis Filosofico","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.389","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The adoption problem was originally raised by Saul Kripke. It is supposed to present a difficulty for Willard Van Orman Quine’s view that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. I want to argue for two things in relation to the adoption problem. The first is that the adoption problem does not really undermine the idea that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. The second is that an analogue of the adoption problem can be developed in order to criticize a form of relativism about logic.
期刊介绍：
Análisis Filosófico is an open access scientific journal issued by the Argentine Society of Philosophical Analysis (SADAF). Since 1981, it offers original and unpublished papers on theoretical and practical philosophy, discussions, critical studies and reviews –in Spanish, English and Portuguese– that contribute to the development of philosophical analysis. Essential conditions for publication are conceptual accuracy, precision and novelty. Its refereeing policy is based on double-blind reviews and external assessment. It is launched twice a year on May and November.
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