Mission Revolution: The US Military and Stability Operations

Mission Revolution: The US Military and Stability Operations By Jennifer Morrison Taw New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012 280 pages $26.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] A recurring debate within US military affairs is whether change within military operations is "revolutionary" because they are a profound, distinct departure from the past, or they are "evolutionary" as the next logical steps in adapting to complex, recurring and somewhat intractable problems. In "Mission Revolution," Professor Jennifer Taw asserts over the past two decades Defense Department civilian and military leaders have made a revolutionary shift in accepting and integrating "stability operations" as a core mission for US military forces. Faced with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and "persistent conflict" in coming years, issuance of DoD Directive 3000.05 was the pivotal point where progressive defense leaders mandated reform and improvements of doctrine, organization and training whereby "stability operations"--the capability to establish order advancing US interests and values--were put on equal footing with offense and defense capabilities. In doing so, progressives began purposefully moving military forces from a warfighting focus on delivering "decisive force" into areas traditionally civilian-dominated efforts due to the rise of complex threats of international criminals, terrorist, and jihadists. Taw offers alternative reasons beyond the past two decades of peacekeeping and counterinsurgency experience as to why such "infamously stubborn institutions" such as the US military would adopt such changes, asserting they are mostly pragmatic and self-interested: that Pentagon leaders now embrace new, non-standard missions reinforcing the utility of military efforts in policy accomplishment in order to retain force structure during future austerity. Taw provides an interesting overview of the historical context and doctrinal development for stability operations throughout US history, noting land forces have been constantly involved in a variety of lesser contingencies and post-war commitments exceeding the capacity and acceptable risk of civilian USG efforts. However, "warfighting" preparation has dominated readiness efforts while assuming the risk that a military prepared for conventional conflict could readily adapt to lesser contingencies where security and stability were the focus of USG efforts. These perspectives ran counter to the needs of post-Cold War Administrations who complained the Pentagon's "all or nothing" to using military force created an expensive military with little utility in shaping and maintaining international order. Much to Secretary Rumsfeld's frustration (who also believed the military shouldn't "do windows"), Iraq and Afghanistan post-conflict requirements again highlighted military force in itself is rarely decisive, and significant skilled and capable military forces are required in insecure environments to accomplish sustainable political outcomes. After this insightful analysis, Taw's explanation of why change occurred is more problematic as she echoes popular criticisms of "militarizing of foreign policy." She proposes this "mission revolution" results from both "securitized instability"--with each Administration's obsession with rising global violence as the preeminent threat to US global interests--providing "institutional privileging" for preserving DoD and military capabilities necessary to counter threats to world order by pernicious jihadists, terrorists, narco-criminal activities. …